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ABSTRACT—Behavioral economics combines economics and psychology 
to produce a body of evidence that individual choice behavior departs from 
that predicted by neoclassical economics in a number of decisionmaking 
situations. Emerging close on the heels of behavioral economics over the 
past thirty years has been the “behavioral law and economics” movement 
and its philosophical foundation—so-called “libertarian paternalism.” Even 
the least paternalistic version of behavioral law and economics makes two 
central claims about government regulation of seemingly irrational 
behavior: (1) the behavioral regulatory approach, by manipulating the way 
in which choices are framed for consumers, will increase welfare as 
measured by each individual’s own preferences and (2) a central planner 
can and will implement the behavioral law and economics policy program 
in a manner that respects liberty and does not limit the choices available to 
individuals. This Article draws attention to the second and less scrutinized 
of the behaviorists’ claims, viz., that behavioral law and economics poses 
no significant threat to liberty and individual autonomy. The behaviorists’ 
libertarian claims fail on their own terms. So long as behavioral law and 
economics continues to ignore the value to economic welfare and individual 
liberty of leaving individuals the freedom to choose and hence to err in 
making important decisions, “libertarian paternalism” will not only fail to 
fulfill its promise of increasing welfare while doing no harm to liberty, it 
will pose a significant risk of reducing both. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Behavioral economics is one of the most significant developments in 
economics over the past thirty-six years. The field combines economics and 
psychology to produce a body of evidence that individual choice behavior 
departs from that predicted by neoclassical economics in a number of 
decisionmaking situations. These departures from rational choice behavior 
are said to be the result of the individual’s “cognitive biases,” that is, 
systematic failures to act in one’s own interest because of defects in one’s 
decisionmaking process. The documentation of these cognitive biases in 
laboratory experiments has been behavioral economics’ primary 
contribution to microeconomics. These biases, behavioral economists 
assert, demonstrate systematically irrational choice behavior by individuals 
and firms. This irrational behavior, in turn, breaks the link between revealed 
preference and individual welfare upon which neoclassical economic theory 
depends. 
Emerging close on the heels of behavioral economics over the past 
thirty years has been the “behavioral law and economics” movement, which 
explores the legal and policy implications of cognitive biases. The legal 
academy has widely disseminated the body of experimental evidence 
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documenting irrational behavior and is largely responsible for the 
behaviorists’ foothold in regulatory policy circles,1 in and out of the Obama 
Administration, and, more recently, the government of the United Kingdom 
as well. Behaviorist proposals include mandates requiring the supply of 
more or better information in an attempt to “debias” individual 
decisionmakers, altering legal default rules, and imposing “sin” taxes upon 
or even banning disfavored products. 
Despite its remarkably broad scope, covering nearly every area of law 
and human behavior, the behavioral law and economics regulatory agenda 
reflects a common philosophical source—so-called libertarian paternalism. 
That seemingly oxymoronic phrase, coined by proponents Richard Thaler 
and Cass Sunstein, is intended to describe legal interventions that both 
(1) increase the individual’s economic welfare by freeing him from the 
limitations of his cognitive biases and (2) change the individual’s behavior 
without limiting his choices.2 In other words, the promise of behavioral law 
and economics is to regulate so as to improve economic welfare by more 
closely aligning each individual’s actual choices with his “true” or unbiased 
preferences without reducing his liberty, at least as it is represented by the 
choices available to him. 
We agree with Thaler and Sunstein’s implicit premise that the 
behavioral law and economics enterprise is properly evaluated by how 
successfully it solves this constrained optimization problem of maximizing 
welfare while respecting liberty. The behaviorists’ economic welfare claims 
have been questioned by economists and some law professors on a variety 
of disparate theoretical, empirical, and institutional grounds, but the 
behaviorists’ claim that their proposed policy interventions do not entail a 
significant reduction in liberty and individual autonomy has been less 
scrutinized. 
The full implications of the behaviorist regulatory agenda for liberty 
are the focus of our analysis. Those implications have not been fully 
appreciated at least in part either because legal scholars have excluded 
libertarian considerations from their regulatory calculus altogether or 
because they have accepted the behaviorists’ conception of liberty as the 
 
1  We refer to adherents of behavioral law and economics as “behaviorists,” but their work is not to 
be confused with the “radical behaviorism” of John Watson and B.F. Skinner. See generally B.F. 
SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1953) (advocating a science of psychology focused upon 
external human behavior to the exclusion of consciousness and other internal phenomena); John B. 
Watson, Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It, 20 PSYCHOL. REV. 158 (1913) (defending the scientific 
study of human behavior). 
2  See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1161‒62 (2003). 
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mere preservation of choices.3 Alas, the behaviorists’ libertarian claims fail 
on even these narrow terms. Nonetheless, as we show in Part IV, the 
behaviorists’ narrow conception excludes the broader liberty interest in 
what Mill, Hayek, Sen, and others taught about the “process aspect of 
freedom.”4 We argue that so long as libertarian paternalism ignores the 
economic welfare and liberty value of allowing individuals the freedom to 
err, it will fail to achieve its goal of increasing welfare without reducing 
liberty and will pose a significant risk of reducing both. 
In Part I we provide a brief history of the economics of irrational 
behavior and describe the research program of modern behavioral 
economics. In Part II we describe the major categories of cognitive biases 
documented in the behavioral economics literature. We also evaluate the 
robustness of those findings and their appropriateness for policy 
implementation in light of a variety of theoretical, experimental, and 
empirical critiques. In Part III we discuss the incorporation of behavioral 
economics into the legal academy and subsequently into policy discourse; 
document the remarkable intellectual distance between the regulatory 
interventions proposed by behaviorists in the legal academy and the policy 
interventions, if any, justified by existing theory and empirical evidence; 
and examine existing welfare-based critiques of behavioral law and 
economics. In Part IV we argue behavioral law and economics poses a 
significant and underappreciated threat to liberty. In Part V we analyze the 
present appeal and future prospects of behavioral law and economics in the 
legal academy.  
I. FROM BOUNDED RATIONALITY TO PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: A 
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
A. Irrationality and Economic Theory 
The neoclassical economic edifice is built upon the foundational 
assumption that economic agents—individuals as well as firms—are 
 
3  Our analysis focuses upon Thaler and Sunstein’s libertarian paternalism because their apparent 
commitment to “choice preservation” evinces a greater concern about liberty than do other behaviorists. 
For example, the “asymmetric paternalism” of Camerer prefers paternalism that “helps those whose 
rationality is bounded from making a costly mistake and harms more rational folks very little.” Colin 
Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric 
Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1254 (2003). This asymmetric paternalism makes no 
commitment to avoiding infringements upon individual autonomy. See id. at 1219 (focusing upon 
paternalism justified because the benefits of error prevention to irrational decisionmakers would exceed 
the harm imposed upon rational individuals). As discussed infra Part III.B, a number of behaviorist 
regulatory proposals would prohibit or tax certain products, reduce consumer choice, or otherwise 
reduce liberty. Thus, Thaler and Sunstein’s libertarian paternalism represents a lower bound on the 
threat to liberty presented by the behaviorist regulatory agenda. 
4  See infra Part IV.A, in which we contrast the “process aspect of freedom,” which is focused upon 
means, with the “opportunity aspect of freedom,” which is focused upon ends. 
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rational maximizers. Indeed, within the model of “perfect competition,” 
economic agents do not make mistakes or commit errors of any kind. 
Sellers are homogenous. Transaction and information costs, including the 
costs of processing information required to make economic decisions, are 
zero. It follows that resources instantaneously flow to their highest valued 
use.5 
That these assumptions are counterfactual is not a critique of price 
theory. After all, the model of perfect competition was not designed for the 
purpose of describing the competitive activities of economic agents. Indeed, 
as Harold Demsetz has pointed out, the neoclassical model has little to say 
about competitive activities at all and is better described as a model of 
“perfect decentralization.”6 The purpose of the model was to demonstrate 
the relative efficiency of decentralized allocation of resources. 
With the academic battle over the relative virtue of market versus 
governmental allocation of resources largely settled by the 1950s, 
economists devoted their efforts to extending the neoclassical framework to 
explain real-world phenomena observed in markets. Beginning with George 
Stigler’s The Economics of Information, economists began to consider the 
costs of obtaining and processing the information required for economic 
decisionmaking.7 The cost of information and the roles of error and of 
irrational behavior in consumer decisionmaking also attracted the attention 
of Armen Alchian, Gary Becker, and Milton Friedman, who demonstrated 
that the tools of price theory were both consistent with and valuable for 
analyzing observed irrational behavior.8 
While the price-theoretic framework was expanding to address 
irrationality from one direction, Herbert Simon offered insights from 
another, planting the seed of what would become the modern behavioral 
economics literature. Simon’s work began with the observation that humans 
do not possess the cognitive capacity to execute all the functions necessary 
to maximize their welfare; instead, human decisionmaking is better 
 
5  See ARMEN A. ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS 114 (3d ed. 1972) 
(explaining that in the model of perfectly competitive markets, “no unexploited opportunity of trade 
remains to enable any person to reach still more preferred situations by revision of the allocation of 
goods”); FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 76–87 (Cosimo, Inc. 2006) (1921). For 
the history and implications of the model of perfect competition, see George J. Stigler, Perfect 
Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1957). 
6  Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 141, 142 (1988). 
7  George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). 
8  See MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE 
ECONOMICS 3, 3–16 (1953); Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. 
POL. ECON. 211, 220‒21 (1950); Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. 
ECON. 1, 12‒13 (1962). 
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explained by “satisficing” behavior.9 He explained the role of mental 
shortcuts or “heuristics” in economizing upon limited cognitive capacity. 
This form of bounded rationality, as Simon described it, generated 
predictions for economic behavior by both individuals and firms that often 
differed from those offered by price theory.10 
In the 1970s, psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky built 
upon Simon’s insights to generate an alternative to the rational choice 
model, which they called “prospect theory.”11 Their work provided the 
intellectual foundation for the modern literature on behavioral economics. 
Based upon a series of laboratory experiments, Kahneman and his various 
co-authors identified departures from rationality and categorized these 
departures by attributing them to one of three sources of bias: 
“representativeness,” “availability,” and “adjustment or anchoring.”12 
The modern research program of behavioral economics, which 
continues to use the approach introduced by Kahneman and Tversky, has 
proceeded largely along two lines. The first line has expanded the set of 
documented cognitive biases, cataloging the systematic departures from 
rational choice observed in experimental and field settings.13 The second 
line of research has tested whether these biases, initially documented in 
experiments within a controlled laboratory setting, are generalizable to 
markets.14 
 
9  Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 493, 
495 (1979); see also Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 
99‒100 (1955) (suggesting, based upon modern psychological insights, revisions to the traditional 
assumption of rationality in economic theory). 
10  See, e.g., RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 10 (2d 
ed. 1992). 
11  Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 
47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 274‒84 (1979). 
12  See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase 
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1329‒36 (1990); Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, 
Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); Kahneman & 
Tversky, supra note 11, at 265‒73; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for 
Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208‒09 (1973); Amos Tversky & 
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY 3 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
13  For a recent review of the literature, see Christine Jolls, Behavioral Law and Economics, in 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 115 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007). 
14  Articles exploring the quantitative and other relevant differences between laboratory and market 
conditions with respect both to study results and to cognitive biases include, e.g., Michael S. Haigh & 
John A. List, Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? An Experimental Analysis, 60 J. 
FIN. 523 (2005) (discussing the sensitivity of laboratory results to market environments where 
competition, expertise, and learning might be expected to ameliorate any biases); Steven D. Levitt et al., 
What Happens in the Field Stays in the Field: Exploring Whether Professionals Play Minimax in 
Laboratory Experiments, 78 ECONOMETRICA 1413 (2010) (same); John A. List, Does Market 
Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q.J. ECON. 41 (2003) [hereinafter List, Market 
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In a series of academic articles, Sunstein and Thaler,15 individually and 
together, made significant contributions to what is now a vast literature 
documenting cognitive biases in a variety of laboratory settings and in some 
field experiments.16 Sunstein and Thaler are best known for introducing the 
concept of “libertarian paternalism,” which they define as “an approach that 
preserves freedom of choice but that authorizes both private and public 
institutions to steer people in directions that will promote their welfare.”17 
Sunstein and Thaler distinguish libertarian paternalism from classic 
paternalist philosophies on the grounds that the former seeks to develop 
legal rules that encourage individuals to maximize their welfare as those 
individuals subjectively define it.18 As discussed below, the concept of 
libertarian paternalism has served as a catalyst, facilitating the creation of a 
behavioral law and economics movement in the legal academy and 
beyond.19 Sunstein and Thaler thus attempt to provide an intellectual link 
between the behavioral economics literature—mapping the conditions 
under which economic decisionmakers err—and a theory of when and how 
the government should regulate their errors.20 
 
Experience] (same); John A. List, Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the 
Marketplace, 72 ECONOMETRICA 615 (2004) [hereinafter List, Neoclassical Theory] (same); and Uri 
Gneezy & John A. List, Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor 
Markets Using Field Experiments (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12063, 2006) 
(same). 
15  Sunstein was formerly a law professor at the University of Chicago Law School and Harvard Law 
School and is currently Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Office 
of Management and Budget, which oversees the regulatory activity of the Executive Branch of the 
government. Thaler is an economist at the University of Chicago Booth Graduate School of Business. 
16  See, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 683 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556 
(2004); Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 2; Richard H. Thaler, Doing Economics Without Homo 
Economicus, in FOUNDATIONS OF RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS: HOW DO ECONOMISTS DO ECONOMICS? 
227 (Steven G. Medema & Warren J. Samuels eds., 1996); Richard Thaler, Mental Accounting and 
Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCI. 199 (1985) [hereinafter Thaler, Mental Accounting]; Richard 
Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980) 
[hereinafter Thaler, Positive Theory]; Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow™: 
Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. S164 (2004); Richard H. 
Thaler & Robyn M. Dawes, Cooperation, in THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF 
ECONOMIC LIFE 6 (1992). 
17  Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175, 179 
(2003); accord RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4‒6 (2008). 
18  See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 175. 
19  See infra Part III. 
20  Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 179 (“Our goal here has been to defend libertarian 
paternalism, an approach that preserves freedom of choice but that authorizes both private and public 
institutions to steer people in directions that will promote their welfare.”). 
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B. Behavioral Economics as a Theory of Errors 
As has long been observed, the assumption of rationality in price 
theory is not meant to characterize the actual decisionmaking process of 
economic agents.21 Rather, rationality is a simplifying assumption made to 
render modeling of economic interactions among firms and consumers 
tractable and to harness the powerful mathematical tools of optimization. 
Therefore, if behavioral economics is to outperform price theory, its 
superiority must be proven by its greater predictive power, not merely by 
the assertion that its underlying assumptions are more “realistic.” 
The behaviorists appear to embrace this challenge. The fundamental 
link holding together the various strands of behavioral economics—or 
behavioral decision theory, as it is sometimes called—is the identification 
of errors in decisionmaking, each of which is independently costly. Thus, 
behavioral economics research is overtly empirical. Behaviorists believe a 
market theory that incorporates “more realistic” psychological accounts of 
economic actors is a means of generating predictive power greater than that 
of economic accounts grounded in the assumption of individual rationality. 
The first stage of the behavioral economics research program is best 
described as developing a comprehensive theory of errors. The theory-
building exercise thus far has focused largely upon the effort to catalog 
circumstances in which economic decisionmakers appear systematically to 
depart from rational choice behavior.22 The second step required to make 
the theory of errors relevant to policy is to map the conditions under which 
specific errors are more or less likely to affect decisions and then to 
generate estimates of the social costs imposed by those errors. This step is 
particularly important when the incidence of a particular decisionmaking 
error is context specific, unevenly distributed throughout the population, 
and likely to interact systematically with other errors. The third step is to 
compare the costs of any proposed corrective intervention against the social 
benefits produced by reducing the rate of error. At present, however, 
research in behavioral economics does not appear to have moved much 
beyond the first step.23 
 
21  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 14 (“Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to 
have ‘assumptions’ that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the 
more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions . . . .”). 
22  See Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and 
Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1627‒28 n.20 (2006) (“The dominant research program 
within behavioral decision theory, the heuristics and biases program, consists of a collection of robust 
empirical findings bound together by high-level concepts rather than an integrative theory that can 
predict how particular features of the mind and environment are likely to interact in particular 
cases . . . .”). 
23  Some notable early efforts to craft a general theory of errors include Botond Kőszegi & Matthew 
Rabin, A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences, 121 Q.J. ECON. 1133 (2006), and Botond Kőszegi 
& Matthew Rabin, Reference-Dependent Risk Attitudes, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1047 (2007). 
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The lack of an integrative theory of errors has not discouraged 
ambitious attempts to leverage the biases documented in the first stage of 
the research program into specific regulatory applications.24 Indeed, the 
mere identification of systematic decision errors leads behaviorists 
seemingly without hesitation to ask: How can government “correct” those 
errors with “choice architecture” or other forms of “libertarian 
paternalism?” 
The minimum required to correct recurring and systematic errors is an 
accounting of their social costs and benefits. The behavioral law and 
economics literature exhibits a strong tendency to ignore the social benefits 
of error. At the same time, it tends to overestimate the social costs of errors 
or at least implicitly to assume the social benefits from reducing identified 
errors will be greater than the social costs of interventions aimed at 
correcting those errors.25 This tendency explains the current condition under 
which “virtually every scholar who has written on the application of 
psychological research on judgment and choice to law has concluded that 
cognitive psychology supports institutional constraint on individual 
choice.”26 
II. IDENTIFYING COGNITIVE ERRORS AND KNOWING WHEN THEY ARISE 
Although the literature documenting cognitive biases continues to 
develop, much of the behavioral law and economics agenda is based upon 
two well-documented and long-recognized categories of cognitive bias: 
contextualization effects and self-control errors. After describing these 
biases, we explain why the research underlying them is not as sound as 
behavioral economists claim. 
A. The Biases 
1. Contextualization Errors: Framing, Prospect Theory, and 
Endowment Effects.—Contextualization errors are those departures 
from rational choice that arise from the context in which the individual 
makes his decision.27 Biases of this type are frequently described as 
 
24  See infra Part III.B. 
25  See infra Part II.B. 
26  Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
1165, 1166 (2003); see also Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not 
Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 73‒74 (2002) 
(characterizing the policy prescriptions of behaviorists as relying upon the empirically false assumption 
that people uniformly suffer from certain cognitive biases). 
27  Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245, 1255 
(2005). 
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“framing effects.”28 These effects are seen when an individual faced with an 
identical set of choices in different contexts makes different choices, 
thereby implying an underlying inconsistency in his preferences, 
denominated “preference reversals.”29 
Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory is most commonly 
associated with framing effects. Prospect theory posits that decisionmakers 
evaluate and maximize expected outcomes not in isolation but rather 
relative to an initial reference point.30 While this effect is uncontroversial, 
prospect theory adds the empirical observation that decisionmakers weigh 
losses from the reference point more heavily than gains, a phenomenon 
described as “loss aversion.” The key experimental finding of prospect 
theory is that individuals are, in many cases, reluctant to sell a good 
endowed to them when offered a sum greater than they are willing to pay to 
acquire the good.31 
This “endowment effect” is the most celebrated, and certainly the most 
discussed, of the cognitive biases in the behavioral law and economics 
literature, in part because behavioral economists and legal scholars claim it 
as the most robust of the biases,32 and in part because of its significant 
policy implications. The principal implication of the endowment effect is 
that the Coase Theorem does not apply,33 and thus market transactions may 
not lead to an efficient allocation of resources, which in turn has 
implications for virtually every area of substantive law.34 Legal scholars 
 
28  See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 
1536‒37 (1998). 
29  See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Amos Tversky, Preference Reversals, in THE WINNER’S CURSE, 
supra note 16, at 79, 79‒81. 
30  Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 11, at 277–79. In this narrow sense, prospect theory implicates 
rational choice behavior. As discussed, however, the reference-dependent preferences against which 
economic agents maximize generally arise from a form of cognitive bias such as “loss aversion.” 
31  Thaler, Positive Theory, supra note 16, at 43‒44; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss 
Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1041‒42 (1991). 
32  See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. 
REV. 1729, 1735 (1998) (“[T]he endowment effect is the most significant empirical observation from 
behavioral economics.”); Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, 
and Status Quo Bias, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 159, 170 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky 
eds., 2000) (describing the robustness of the endowment effect as “part of our endowment, and we are 
naturally keener to retain it than others might be to acquire it”); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment 
Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1229 (2003) (“The endowment effect is 
undoubtedly the most significant single finding from behavioral economics for legal analysis to date.”). 
33  Cf. Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal 
and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 99 (1993) (illustrating how a difference between a 
person’s willingness to pay to purchase a good and the price the same person is willing to accept to sell 
the same good could prevent Coasean bargaining); Jolls et al., supra note 28, at 1497 (“[A]n important 
aspect of law and economics is the Coase theorem, which says that the assignment of a legal entitlement 
will not influence the ultimate allocation of that entitlement . . . .”). 
34  See Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An 
Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13 (2010) (“Recognition of the systematic discrepancy between 
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have certainly not missed many opportunities to elaborate on these 
implications.35 For example, they have relied upon failures of Coasean 
bargaining caused by the endowment effect to reexamine areas of property 
law,36 tort law,37 contract law,38 and intellectual property.39 
2. Self-Control Problems: Hyperbolic Discounting and Optimism 
Bias.—The behavioral economics literature focuses upon two 
types of biases affecting self-control. The first involves systematic errors in 
decisions allocating resources over time. In other words, individuals place 
so much weight upon immediate gratification that they regularly make 
decisions they will later come to regret. Stable, time-consistent preferences 
require a constant exponential discount factor; hyperbolic discounting 
generates time-inconsistent preferences, sometimes described as present 
bias.40 Rather than discounting the future exponentially, as is done when 
calculating present value, hyperbolic discounting entails placing an 
extremely high weight upon the present, after which future values decline 
exponentially.41 Behavioral economists have relied upon hyperbolic 
discounting to explain a wide array of self-control problems, ranging from 
 
owner and purchaser valuations has caused legal scholars to reevaluate many areas of the law where 
Coasean bargaining has been influential.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 106, 112 (2002) (“The Coase Theorem fails to account for the fact that the initial allocation seems 
to create an endowment effect. When the endowment effect is at work, those who initially receive a 
legal right value it more than they would if the initial allocation had given the right to someone else.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
35  As of June 19, 2012, a search of the Westlaw Journals & Law Reviews (JLR) database reveals 
1094 articles in legal periodicals referencing “endowment effect.” The same search on Google Scholar 
shows 1030 references in legal periodicals and court opinions. According to one legal scholar, a broader 
search for “endowment effect” or “status quo bias” revealed that the terms were referenced in only two 
legal periodicals in 1990 but in 373 by 2003. Korobkin, supra note 32, at 1229. 
36  See, e.g., William A. Fischel, The Offer/Ask Disparity and Just Compensation for Takings: A 
Constitutional Choice Perspective, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 187, 187 (1995); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & 
Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1542‒46 (1998). 
37  See, e.g., Jack L. Knetsch, Biased Valuations, Damage Assessments, and Policy Choices: The 
Choice of Measure Matters, 63 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 684, 684‒85 (2007); Edward J. McCaffery et al., 
Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341, 1351‒54 
(1995). 
38  See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 608, 630‒33 (1998). 
39  See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 31, 51‒52 (2011) (arguing evidence of an endowment effect in experiments simulating 
intellectual property markets “undermine[s] the normative justification for an IP law structured around 
strong property rules”); Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 34, at 2‒4. 
40  See Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, in TIME 
AND DECISION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 13, 24‒26 
(George Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003). 
41  See id. 
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overeating, to incurring excessive debt, to gambling and other forms of 
addiction.42 
The second type of self-control error is optimism bias.43 Behavioral 
economists have identified circumstances in which individuals appear to 
underestimate the likelihood of their experiencing a loss. Jolls, Sunstein, 
and Thaler describe optimism bias as “[a] common feature of human 
behavior” characterized by people tending to “think that bad events are far 
less likely to happen to them than to others.”44 The tendency to 
underestimate the likelihood of a bad outcome leads decisionmakers to take 
on too much risk.45 Accordingly, this bias is often blamed for an 
individual’s impulsive or high-risk choices that might indicate a lack of 
self-control.46 
B. Empirical Shortcomings: Robustness and Data Interpretation 
While the experimental findings of cognitive biases are interesting, it 
does not necessarily follow that they are useful for policy purposes. One 
need not (and we do not) reject the existence of behavioral biases in order to 
raise doubts about the policy relevance of purely experimental results. A 
significant concern for the behavioral law and economics policy agenda is 
that biases documented in experimental settings may not prove robust when 
exposed to market institutions.47 Indeed, as others have pointed out, many 
(but not all) of the behaviorists’ findings are fragile and disappear when 
exposed to market discipline and the profit motive, which create incentives 
 
42  See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2004) (relying 
upon hyperbolic discounting to explain why people incur extensive credit card debt); Jonathan Gruber & 
Botond Kőszegi, Tax Incidence When Individuals Are Time-Inconsistent: The Case of Cigarette Excise 
Taxes, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1959, 1960 (2004) (using hyperbolic discounting to explain cigarette smoking); 
Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic Theory, 58 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1275 (1991) (discussing how imperfect self-control results in insufficient saving for 
retirement). 
43  Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 806, 806‒07 (1980). 
44  Jolls et al., supra note 28, at 1524. 
45  Optimism bias can be characterized as contextual; individuals reach inordinately optimistic 
conclusions due to their failure to process information that would give them an accurate risk perception. 
Nevertheless, most behaviorist commentators group optimism bias with irrational failures of self-
control. 
46  See Bar-Gill, supra note 42, at 1376 (explaining how optimism bias could cause consumers to 
underestimate the occurrence of a future event that might necessitate borrowing). On the other hand, 
pessimism bias occurs when an individual overestimates the occurrence of adverse events. Cass R. 
Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 773 (2003) (book review) (“With respect to 
some low-probability events, including life-threatening risks such as AIDS, people actually tend to 
overestimate their own susceptibility, and in that sense seem to show pessimistic bias.”). 
47  See generally Steven D. Levitt & John A. List, Viewpoint: On the Generalizability of Lab 
Behaviour to the Field, 40 CANADIAN J. ECON. 347 (2007) (analyzing properties of human behavior that 
limit the power of inferences drawn from laboratory results in markets). 
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for participants to specialize and to learn to reduce their errors.48 These 
incentives are not present in the laboratory.49 To support a policy 
intervention, however, experimental research must (1) yield data that are 
robust and (2) be interpreted carefully to distinguish irrational behavior 
from efficient mistakes. The current research agenda fails to meet either 
requirement.50 
1. Experimental Evidence and Data Accrual.—Behaviorists propose 
to alter the regulatory regime in broad and fundamental ways. It is a 
bedrock principle of both law and science that such advocates of change 
bear the burden of demonstrating the superiority of their theories. The 
existing data marshaled in support of behaviorist proposals generally, 
however, fail to meet this standard for several reasons. First, much if not 
most of the data suggesting cognitive biases affect individual 
decisionmaking are drawn from experimental settings and the bias has not 
been shown to persist in the presence of market institutions.51 This 
limitation is especially significant because some biases found in the 
laboratory have been shown not to survive exposure to real-world settings.52 
Second, even within the confines of the laboratory, results may be sensitive 
to relatively small changes in experimental procedures. Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, the evidence supporting the behaviorist regulatory regime 
has not been subjected to comparative institutional analysis; there is little to 
no evidence that any particular behavioral regulation would reduce errors 
more efficiently than would market institutions. Nonetheless, a regulator 
faced with behaviorist advocacy, even if unsupported by empirical data 
sufficient to reject alternative theories, may readily embrace the behaviorist 
model because it produces outcomes closest to his own preconceptions. 
Behavioral economists are, of course, aware of the need for 
experiments that isolate and identify biases that persist in market 
 
48  See Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 140 (2006) (“In 
experiments, individuals have few tools with which to improve their reasoning, and their only real 
method of responding to incentives is to think harder.”). 
49  See Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (2002); Joshua D. Wright, Behavioral Law and Economics, Paternalism, and 
Consumer Contracts: An Empirical Perspective, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 470, 471–72 (2007); see also 
sources cited supra note 14. 
50  The most obvious failure is to attribute all errors to irrational behavior when rational economic 
agents would not reduce their error rate to zero because the gains to error reduction are small relative to 
its cost. For example, consumer errors in selecting the best credit card from among several choices are 
often attributed to irrational behavior despite the low cost of making an error that can readily be 
corrected with experience, the relatively high cost of analyzing competing offers, and evidence that the 
error rate declines as the cost of errors increases. See infra Part II.B.2. 
51  See, e.g., Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 39, at 51 (advocating various intellectual property 
reforms on the basis of experimental evidence). 
52  See Vernon L. Smith, Economics in the Laboratory, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 118 (1994); sources 
cited supra note 14. 
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environments as a precondition to regulation designed to mitigate those 
biases; nevertheless, the available data frequently fall short of that standard 
because they fail to account for the possibility of multiple and simultaneous 
biases,53 do not adequately control for experimental procedures that might 
bias studies in favor of finding bias,54 or cannot rule out rational behavior as 
an explanation for the observed conduct. 
This is true even of the bias most cited in support of the behaviorist 
agenda—the endowment effect.55 As mentioned above, prospect theory is 
based upon the purported gap between willingness to accept (WTA) and 
willingness to pay (WTP)—the idea that individuals will report a lower 
WTP for a particular good than their WTA after they have been given the 
same good.56 As economist David Levine explains, however, it is not at all 
clear that evidence of a WTA–WTP gap implies a preference reversal: 
 On the surface [the appearance of a gap] is not much of a paradox: we all 
know to buy low and sell high. However: the elicitation of values is done using 
a method called the Becker Marschak DeGroot [1964] elicitation procedure. A 
willingness to pay or accept payment is stated, then a random draw is made. If 
the random draw is lower than the stated value (in the willingness to pay case) 
then the item is sold at the randomly drawn price. If the draw is higher than the 
stated value then no transaction takes place. 
 Is it obvious to you that when this procedure is used that the unambiguously 
best course of action is to bid your true value and not buy low and sell high? It 
is true, and subjects are often informed of this fact. So: is there a paradox here, 
as some behavioral economists and psychologists would argue, or, . . . is it 
simply the case that people have trouble understanding a complex and 
unfamiliar procedure?57 
A critical precondition to acting upon the purported WTA–WTP gap is 
to know, rather than to assume, the reason it arises. Charles Plott and 
Kathryn Zeiler demonstrate that observed gaps can be explained by 
misconceptions about experimental protocols and the experimental task; 
 
53  See Thomas A. Lambert, Two Mistakes Behavioralists Make: A Response to Professors 
Feigenson et al. and Professor Slovic, 69 MO. L. REV. 1053, 1054‒55 (2004). 
54  Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of 
Endowment Effect Theory and Prospect Theory?, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1454‒56 (2007) 
[hereinafter Plott & Zeiler, Exchange]; Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay–
Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental 
Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 530, 532‒35 (2005) [hereinafter Plott & Zeiler, 
Willingness]. 
55  See, e.g., Plott & Zeiler, Exchange, supra note 54, at 1454; Plott & Zeiler, Willingness, supra 
note 54, at 532. 
56  See, e.g., Plott & Zeiler, Willingness, supra note 54, at 530‒31. 
57  DAVID K. LEVINE, IS BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS DOOMED?: THE ORDINARY VERSUS THE 
EXTRAORDINARY (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 6–7), available at http://www.dklevine.com/ 
general/behavioral/ch6.pdf. 
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when those misconceptions are dispelled and a full set of experimental 
controls is employed to eliminate them, contrary to prospect theory, such 
gaps disappear.58 
Plott and Zeiler’s results do not eliminate the possibility that prospect 
theory is the best explanation of the WTA–WTP gap observed in some 
improved experimental settings.59 That finding would encourage further 
inquiry and elicit a serious scholarly discussion of the origins of WTA–
WTP gaps, skeptically approached, as would any theory contradicted by 
robust evidence. Indeed, experimental economists continue to study the 
conditions under which WTA–WTP gaps might appear independent of the 
subjects’ misconceptions and whether any such gaps are explained by the 
reference-dependent preferences contemplated by prospect theory.60 
Although the debate rages on in economics, the legal academy has leapt to 
the conclusion that individuals act irrationally in actual market transactions. 
Over 1000 articles in legal periodicals reference the “endowment effect.”61 
Of the 396 articles published after Zeiler’s and Plott’s first two articles 
appeared, only 34 cite either one of them.62 
The scientific method obliges behaviorist scholars to disclose and to 
discuss alternative theories for explaining observed facts. The 
methodological commitmentin Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler’s words, to 
produce a “higher R2”63reflects acceptance of both scientific rigor and the 
pursuit of objectively verifiable knowledge. That only 10% of the legal 
articles citing the endowment effect even refer to the leading contrary 
 
58  Plott & Zeiler, Exchange, supra note 54, at 1462; Plott & Zeiler, Willingness, supra note 54, at 
531‒32. 
59  Plott & Zeiler, Exchange, supra note 54, at 1462 (“While we do challenge the general accuracy of 
endowment effect theory, we do not challenge prospect theory . . . .”). Others have also found prospect 
theory to have limited power in explaining WTA–WTP gaps. See Stephanie Kovalchik et al., Aging and 
Decision Making: A Comparison Between Neurologically Healthy Elderly and Young Individuals, 58 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 79, 85–87 (2005) (finding results consistent with Plott & Zeiler on the 
endowment effect). 
60  See, e.g., Jack L. Knetsch & Wei-Kang Wong, The Endowment Effect and the Reference State: 
Evidence and Manipulations, 71 J. ECON BEHAV. & ORG. 407, 408 (2009); Keith M. Marzilli Ericson & 
Andreas Fuster, Expectations as Endowments: Evidence on Reference-Dependent Preferences from 
Exchange and Valuation Experiments, 126 Q.J. ECON. 1879, 1879‒83 (2011). One recent study replies 
to Plott and Zeiler’s findings and has elicited a response from them. See Andrea Isoni et al., The 
Willingness to Pay—Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and 
Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations: Comment, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 991 (2011); Charles 
R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay—Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment 
Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations: Reply, 101 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1012 (2011). 
61  A search on May 31, 2012, of the Westlaw Journals & Law Reviews (JLR) database for the term 
“endowment effect” resulted in 1087 articles that include the term. 
62  These results are based upon the search referenced supra note 61, with the results restricted to 
articles written after September 1, 2007. 
63  Jolls et al., supra note 28, at 1487 (“Behavioral law and economics, in short, offers the potential 
to be law and economics with a higher ‘R2’—that is, greater power to explain the observed data.”). 
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literature suggests that in the legal academy, pursuit of the behaviorist 
policy agenda is only minimally constrained by the norms of scientific 
inquiry. 
Similar problems plague the literature on framing effects. As Gregory 
Mitchell has observed, though the existence of framing effects is not 
disputed—indeed, such effects have long been noticed in public opinion 
polling64—the effects are not robust to even small changes in experimental 
settings.65 For example, small manipulations in the decisionmaking context, 
such as asking subjects to think about the possible success or failure of their 
options, to give reasons for their choices, or to deliberate more analytically, 
can reduce or eliminate the influence of framing effects.66 Mitchell also 
highlights evidence that stable preferences prevail in settings where choices 
are made frequently and involve less emotion, more deliberation or 
reflection, or a smaller number of options, or where the subject is well 
informed.67 These findings suggest framing effects can be reduced or 
eliminated at low cost without the extensive interventions proposed by 
libertarian paternalists.68 As we will discuss in Part II.B.2, a fundamental 
problem with the behaviorists’ regulatory agenda is that its proposals are 
not calibrated to the costs of “debiasing” behavioral biases as evidenced by 
experiments; to the contrary, behaviorist proposals frequently assume that 
the social costs of cognitive error are large and presumptively greater than 
the cost of the regulatory solution designed to reduce them. 
2. Data Interpretation and Rational Error.—Even if there were 
robust evidence of irrationality in markets, such evidence would have to be 
interpreted with care; the challenge would be to distinguish truly irrational 
behavior from rationally made and therefore efficient mistakes. Efficient 
mistakes occur because rational economic actors economize on both 
information and transaction costs. In short, not all errors imply irrationality 
because perfect decisionmaking would be costly. To miss subtle 
distinctions between rational and irrational decisionmaking will almost 
 
64  See generally STANLEY L. PAYNE, THE ART OF ASKING QUESTIONS (1951) (discussing how 
varying the wording of a question can affect survey outcomes); Donald Rugg & Hadley Cantril, The 
Wording of Questions, 37 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 469, reprinted in GAUGING PUBLIC OPINION 
23 (1944) (same). 
65  See Mitchell, supra note 27, at 1256 n.40. 
66  Id. at 1255‒56. 
67  Id. at 1253. 
68  Id. at 1255–60. Libertarian paternalists have relied upon framing effects, and particularly the 
endowment effect, to justify significant policy interventions, including switching the legal default rule 
from “at will” to “for cause” termination, redistributing various property rights, and preferring liability 
rules over property rules. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 32, at 1259–69, 1283–87 (respectively 
discussing proposals to redistribute property rights relying upon the endowment effect and favoring 
liability rules over property rules); Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 2, at 1187 (advocating the Model 
Employment Termination Act).  
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certainly lead to erroneous conclusions about legal policy. The data 
required to distinguish rational mistakes from irrational mistakes, much less 
to estimate the magnitude of any welfare loss caused by the latter, are 
significant and may be unavailable. 
The behavioral law and economics literature nonetheless fails to 
distinguish between rational and irrational errors, assuming instead that 
error reduction is always efficient. Where there are information and 
transaction costs, however, the efficient level of error is not zero.69 For 
example, if a consumer could switch from Credit Card A to Credit Card B at 
a transaction cost of $10, but Credit Card B is only $5 superior to Credit 
Card A, then the consumer’s failure to switch is not evidence of his 
irrationality. Consider the problems encountered if a behavioral economist 
tries to interpret the following stylized facts from an empirical study of 
consumers’ selection of credit cards following a natural experiment in 
which a card company offers them two cards: (1) one card has a higher 
interest rate but no annual fee and (2) the other has a lower interest rate and 
an annual fee. What do the behavioral theories of consumer credit predict? 
Oren Bar-Gill, who, along with Elizabeth Warren, championed 
creation of the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), argues 
that consumers consistently underestimate their future borrowing due to a 
potpourri of behavioral biases such as imperfect self-control, hyperbolic 
discounting, and systematic underestimation of the probability of negative 
consequences.70 Rather than viewing “teaser rates,” zero annual fees, and 
rewards programs as signs of intense and healthy competition among credit 
card issuers, they and others have argued that card issuers design such 
products and contracts to exploit the behavioral biases of consumers.71 Bar-
Gill argues that competition on these margins leaves consumers worse off 
because their expressed credit choices do not reflect their true preferences.72 
This “predatory lender” interpretation of the credit market gives rise to 
several testable hypotheses about the underlying behavioral theories. First, 
 
69  This point is doubly salient when one considers that behaviorists often assert the inapplicability 
of the Coase Theorem due to the mere presence of transaction costs. See supra Part II.A.1. 
70  Bar-Gill, supra note 42, at 1395–1411. 
71  E.g., MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION 
12 (2008), available at www.newamerica.net/files/naf_behavioral_v5.pdf (“Credit card companies have 
fine-tuned product offerings and disclosures in a manner that appears to be systematically designed to 
prey on common psychological biases—biases that limit consumer ability to make rational choices 
regarding credit card borrowing.”); Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1, 46‒52 (2008) (providing examples of numerous product design features that can be used to 
exploit consumer biases); Elizabeth Warren, Redesigning Regulation: A Case Study from the Consumer 
Credit Market, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 391, 391 
(Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010) (“Businesses have learned to exploit customers’ 
systematic cognitive errors, selling complex credit products that are loaded with tricks and traps.”). 
72  See Bar-Gill, supra note 42, at 1411–12. 
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we should expect to see a significant majority of consumers selecting the 
wrong card—that is, the card that does not maximize interest-cost savings 
net of any annual fee paid. Second, we should expect the consumers’ error 
rate, if it is the product of irrationality, to remain invariant to the cost of the 
error. Third, we should expect consumers who carry monthly balances 
instead of paying them off to hold cards with high rewards and no annual 
fee. This third hypothesis is the heart of the Bar-Gill “seduction by plastic” 
argument that consumers who revolve debt are irrationally optimistic about 
their financial prospects, leading them to select the card better suited for 
nonrevolvers.73 
The data bear out none of these expectations. Agarwal et al. found that 
approximately 60% of consumers selected the “optimal” card.74 Of the 40% 
who did not, many corrected their errors with some experience and only “a 
small minority of consumers persist[ed] in holding substantially sub-
optimal contracts without switching.”75 The authors found these errors were 
bounded in magnitude by the level of the annual fee (typically around 
$25).76 Further, and consistent with neoclassical economic theory, the 
probability of selecting the optimal credit card increased both with the cost 
of the error and with repeat decisions, which suggests that learning 
mitigates the effects of the relevant biases.77 All of these findings are 
consistent with rational (but, of course, not perfect) decisionmaking and, 
more specifically, with price theory. Further, contrary to the behaviorist 
model, “more nonrevolvers than revolvers” carried “cards with average 
minimum APRs greater than 10 percent . . . .”78 “This result does not 
support the hypothesis that hyperbolic discounting results in consumers 
bearing credit card debt at high interest rates.”79 
The available data strongly suggest consumers make rational choices in 
the credit card market. The upper bound of the initial error rate suggests 
switching costs would outweigh any potential gains consumers might 
realize from changing cards—the error rate is efficient. How would a 
behaviorist interpret these same data? Warren explains her approach as 
follows: 
 
73  Id. at 1400. 
74  Sumit Agarwal et al., Do Consumers Choose the Right Credit Contracts? 4 (November 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=843826. 
75  Id. at 5. 
76  Id. at 4‒5, 7. That potential consumer irrationality is bounded by the level of the relevant cost is 
potent indirect evidence for the proposition that even relatively minor market pressures will dissipate 
behavioral errors made in a laboratory. 
77  Id. at 15. 
78  Tom Brown & Lacey Plache, Paying with Plastic: Maybe Not So Crazy, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 
80 (2006). 
79  Id. 
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What’s the point of offering two different products, except to hope that the 
number of consumer [sic] who get it wrong will exceed in dollar volume the 
number who get it right. Or, from an informed consumers’ [sic] perspective, 
perhaps the optimal system is one in which they make good decisions and 
hope for cross-subsidization from less-clever consumers who help keep credit 
cards highly profitable and easy to use in a variety of settings (e.g., grocery 
stores, cabs, pizza deliveries, etc.). 
 I realize it is heresy in many circles to ask if consumers should have fewer 
choices. But at some point the empirical studies about high error rates bring 
into question the assumptions that underlie the claim that more choice is 
always good.80 
Professor Warren’s answer is simple: A high error rate implies irrationality, 
and irrationality implies the need for choice-reducing regulation. It is also 
simplistic. 
Warren’s interpretationthe behaviorist interpretationof the data 
reveals her methodology, which results in three significant errors. First, the 
initial error rate of 40% is evaluated without reference to the costs of 
switching; therefore, no attention is paid to the fundamental challenge of 
identifying the efficient rate of error. Second, no weight is assigned to the 
finding that the error rate decreases both with the cost of error and with 
repeat decisionmaking, facts that are consistent with rational choice but 
difficult to reconcile with the models of consumer behavior in credit 
markets put forth by Bar-Gill and others. Third, Warren describes the errors 
as “staggering,”81 but does not address the finding that the magnitude of 
these costs is bounded by the size of the typically small annual fee. While 
the initial error rate is indeed high, her evaluation of the rationality and 
welfare properties of the choice occurs in a vacuum where the costs of error 
or of investment to correct the error are ignored and thus effectively 
assumed to be zero. Warren’s leap from identifying the error rate to 
questioning whether “more choice is always good” illustrates what Harold 
Demsetz famously called the Nirvana Fallacythe failure to ask: compared 
to what?82 
Our point is not merely that we disagree with Warren’s interpretation 
of this single study. The more general point is that Warren’s analysis 
ignores fundamental economic concepts and threatens to subject consumers 
 
80  Elizabeth Warren, Economic Model Almost Working or Broken?, CREDIT SLIPS (Dec. 26, 2006, 
04:12 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2006/12/economic_model_.html. 
81  Id. 
82  See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–3 
(1969) (“The view that now pervades much public policy economics implicitly presents the relevant 
choice as between an ideal norm and an existing ‘imperfect’ institutional arrangement. This nirvana 
approach differs considerably from a comparative institution approach in which the relevant choice is 
between alternative real institutional arrangements.”). 
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to a serious policy error by conflating rational choice with irrational 
behavior—that is, by ignoring switching and other costs incurred 
everywhere except in Nirvana—and by avoiding comparative institutional 
analysis. 
C. Compounding the Shortcomings of the Research with Policy Error 
As previously discussed, behavioral economics research has largely 
consisted of identifying, documenting, and classifying apparent errors in 
decisionmaking. What has thus far eluded the researchers is a theoretical 
mapping of the real-world conditions under which individual decisions will 
be fettered by these cognitive biases and when they will not.83 This gap in 
the behavioral theory of errors is critical because it makes it inevitable that, 
in attempting to correct for cognitive biases, behavioral interventions will 
lead to policy errors. 
The inevitability of policy errors derives from the insurmountable 
theoretical and empirical obstacles to identifying any one person’s, let alone 
the distribution of all persons’, “true preferences.” One type of policy error 
will occur when a behavioral intervention is aimed at seemingly irrational 
behavior that is in fact rational for the decisionmaker in question. In other 
words, the social costs of this type of policy error flow from encouraging 
behavior the paternalist inaccurately believes will make individuals better 
off and concomitantly discouraging acts that satisfy their actual preferences. 
A second type of policy error will occur when an intervention designed to 
improve the decisionmaking of truly irrational economic agents imposes 
costs, as it inevitably will, upon all those who are not irrational and for 
whom the same decision is not an error. In this case, it is erroneous beliefs 
about the distribution of true preferences that lead to the policy error. For 
example, even if a particular default rule meant to offset a cognitive bias 
will reduce some individual errors in decisionmaking, failure to calibrate 
the default rule to the distribution of true preferences may impose social 
costs upon rational decisionmakers that are greater than any benefits in 
error reduction. 
The risk of policy error is significant, however, even if consumers’ 
error rate is 100%. For example, behaviorists repackage the “sin tax” as a 
means to reduce hyperbolic discounting by consumers of certain goods, 
such as cigarettes, that often have deleterious health effects in the long run. 
But even if all consumers in the market exhibit present bias in consumption 
and the intervention is successful in reducing the rate of consumption, the 
question remains whether the social costs saved are greater than the social 
 
83  See Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and 
Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620 (2006); Mitchell, supra note 27. 
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costs of intervention. In the case of a sin tax, the likelihood of this type of 
policy error is exacerbated because regulators do not, and surely cannot, 
have accurate knowledge of every consumer’s, or even the average 
consumer’s, “true” preferences or the discount rate necessary to calculate 
the optimal tax. The expanding behavioral law and economics agenda 
largely disregards these risks. 
III. FROM BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS TO BEHAVIORAL  
LAW AND ECONOMICS 
The quest to translate the insights of behavioral economics, such as 
they are, into public policies intended to improve decisionmaking and 
welfare has achieved a remarkable degree of momentum. In addition to 
Thaler and Sunstein’s recent book, Nudge: Improving Decisions About 
Health, Wealth, and Happiness, a popular summary of the behavioral 
approach to law, and Dan Ariely’s similarly oriented Predictably Irrational, 
there is abundant evidence that behavioral law and economics is affecting 
public policy. Indeed, a recent account in the popular press describes 
behavioral economics as “the governing theory” of the Obama 
Administration’s regulatory agenda, in part because Cass Sunstein now 
heads the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Executive 
Office of the President, which reviews proposed regulations before they can 
be issued.84 To give concrete examples, behavioral economics provided the 
intellectual blueprint for the CFPB, which the Congress created at the 
urging of the Obama Administration,85 and a member of the Federal Trade 
Commission has discussed taking a more behavioral approach to enforcing 
the antitrust laws.86 Regulatory proposals informed by behavioral law and 
economics span the law school curriculum, ranging from antitrust and 
 
84  Andrew Ferguson, Nudge Nudge, Wink Wink: Behavioral Economics—The Governing Theory of 
Obama’s Nanny State, WKLY. STANDARD, Apr. 19, 2010, at 18, 18. Time Magazine described the 
Obama Administration’s advisers as a “behavioral dream team” that would rely upon behavioral 
economics to “transform the country.” Michael Grunwald, How Obama Is Using the Science of Change, 
TIME, Apr. 13, 2009, at 28, 29. 
85  Warren, a prominent behaviorist in her own right, was charged with setting up the CFPB. For 
examples of her writing on behavioral economics and consumer choice, see Bar-Gill & Warren, supra 
note 71, at 39, and Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, 5 DEMOCRACY 8 (2007). Sendhil 
Mullainathan, a leading behavioral economist, was recently appointed CFPB Assistant Director for 
Research. For a criticism of the behavioral approach to regulating consumer credit, see David S. Evans 
& Joshua D. Wright, The Effect of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 on Consumer 
Credit, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 277 (2010). The CFPB and its roots in behavioral law and 
economics are discussed infra Part III.B.2. 
86  J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Behavioral Economics: Observations Regarding 
Issues That Lie Ahead, Remarks Before the Vienna Competition Conference 12‒15 (June 9, 2010), 
available at http://ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100609viennaremarks.pdf. For a skeptical account of the 
implications of behavioral economics for antitrust, see Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone, 
Misbehavioral Economics: The Case Against Behavioral Antitrust, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1517 (2012). 
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consumer protection to discrimination and employment law. The depth and 
breadth of the behaviorist agenda is in no small part due to its success in the 
legal academy. 
A. The Rise of Behavioral Law and Economics in the Legal Academy 
The legal academy is the driving force behind the rise of behavioral 
law and economics and its growing influence in policy debates. Legal 
academics have discovered in the behavioral economics literature a rich 
supply of empirical findings they can marshal in support of paternalistic 
regulatory interventions. Indeed, law professors have produced hundreds of 
such articles in a relatively short time.87 From 1980 through 1984, across all 
legal publications, only a single article mentioned the term “behavioral 
economics.” From 2005 through 2009, however, 988 articles mentioned the 
term.88 This dramatic increase has been duplicated in books. As Figure 1 
shows, the terms “behavioral economics,” “endowment effect,” and 
“cognitive bias” have experienced an equally dramatic increase in usage 
over the same time period. 
 
FIGURE 1: REFERENCES TO “BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS” 
 
 
87  As of May 31, 2012, a search of the Westlaw JLR database finds 2281 articles in legal periodicals 
referencing “behavioral economics.” A search on Google Scholar turns up 2190 legal opinions and 
articles referencing the same term. 
88  Based on data that first appeared in Douglas H. Ginsburg & Derek W. Moore, The Future of 
Behavioral Economics in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 89, 93‒96 (2010), 
which Figure 1 updates. The number of references in the Google Book search was compiled by the 
authors at books.google.com on December 22, 2010. The Y-axis on the left hand side of Figure 1 
measures the number of times the term “behavioral economics” appears in the Westlaw JLR database in 
the relevant time period. The Y-axis on the right hand side of Figure 1 measures the number of times 
each of the three terms appears in Google Books. 
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The increasing footprint of behavioral law and economics in the legal 
academy extends beyond legal scholarship, via law school faculties, into the 
law school curriculum. For example, ten of the top twenty law schools in 
the United States have offered at least one course in behavioral law and 
economics in the past five years.89 
There has also been a concerted effort to transplant the research agenda 
of behavioral economics overseas, particularly to Europe. In April 2004, the 
European Network for the Advancement of Behavioural Economics 
(ENABLE), a joint venture between European universities with nascent 
behavioral institutes and established programs at Harvard and Princeton, 
undertook a mission to “advance this emerging field of behavioural 
economics in Europe” by facilitating the “development of a critical mass of 
the brightest young researchers by concentrating the currently highly 
fragmented expertise in Europe.”90 
B. Some Behavioral Law and Economics Regulatory Proposals 
Behaviorist regulatory proposals run the gamut from gentle attempts to 
encourage retirement savings to outright bans of certain products.91 
Common to each of these proposals is the claim that the intervention will 
improve individuals’ decisionmaking by reducing errors attributable to 
cognitive biases and bounded rationality, thus making each individual better 
off as measured by his own preferences.92 Some proposals would modify 
legal default rules; others invoke “choice architecture” to manipulate 
framing effects. Some behaviorist proposals do not directly restrict the set 
 
89  Data compiled by authors (on file with Northwestern University Law Review). The law schools 
are those of Yale University, Harvard University, the University of Chicago, New York University, 
Columbia University, Vanderbilt University, the University of California at Los Angeles, the University 
of Virginia, the University of Pennsylvania, and Georgetown University. 
90  First European Summer Symposium in Behavioural Economics, CENTRE FOR ECON. POL’Y RES., 
http://www.cepr.org/meets/meetings/meetdesc.asp?meetno=5525 (last visited Aug. 13, 2012). The 
ENABLE network, funded in part by the European Commission, completed its work in March 2008. 
EUROPEAN NETWORK FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF BEHAV. ECON., http://www.cepr.org/research/ 
networks/enable/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2012). The research training network enlisted several prominent 
figures in behavioral economics, including Daniel Kahneman of Princeton University and David 
Laibson of Harvard University. People, EUROPEAN NETWORK FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF BEHAV. 
ECON., http://www.cepr.org/research/networks/enable/people_new.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2012). 
91  Descriptions of the behaviorist approach similarly vary, from Sunstein & Thaler’s preferred 
“libertarian paternalism” to the more restrictive “asymmetric paternalism” and the more constraining 
“new paternalism.” See Camerer et al., supra note 3, at 1212 (“A regulation is asymmetrically 
paternalistic if it creates large benefits for those who make errors, while imposing little or no harm on 
those who are fully rational.”); Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of 
New Paternalism, 2009 BYU L. REV. 905, 908 (“The new paternalism, by contrast, takes the 
individual’s own subjective preferences as the basis for policy recommendations. New paternalist 
policies allegedly help the individual to better achieve his own subjective well-being, which cognitive 
impediments prevent him from attaining on his own.”). 
92  See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 28, at 1536‒37; Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 178‒79. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1056 
of choices available to consumers but impose a cooling-off period or some 
other burden placed upon producers that, in turn, results in higher prices, 
reduced variety, or both.93 
1. Choice Architecture and Retirement Savings.—The most 
frequently discussed example of a behavioral intervention invoking choice 
architecture is default enrollment in employer-sponsored savings plans. 
Sunstein and Thaler have argued that a law “requir[ing] employers to 
provide automatic enrollment and allow[ing] employees to opt out” would 
be consistent with libertarian paternalism.94 Others less concerned with 
preserving the opportunity to opt out have suggested that firms be required 
by law to make enrollment automatic.95 
The most common behavioral argument in support of automatic 
enrollment is that, freed of the “status quo bias” and the “sticky” nature of 
defaults, many more employees would enroll in a savings plan than actually 
enroll at present.96 Sunstein and Thaler contend that if employees only 
thought more carefully about the enrollment decision, they would act upon, 
and hence reveal, their true preference, causing enrollment rates to rise.97 
The “Save More Tomorrow” plan—a defined contribution retirement 
savings plan in which the contribution rate of those who do not opt out 
increases automatically when an enrollee receives a pay raise—was 
designed to “help those employees who would like to save more but lack 
the willpower to act on this desire.”98 Sunstein and Thaler describe Save 
More Tomorrow as “successful libertarian paternalism in action” because it 
has resulted in increased enrollment and savings rates at the handful of 
firms that have implemented it.99 Paradoxically, this claim of a successful 
behavioral intervention is based upon the failure of employees to opt out of 
the new default.100 That is, in order to evaluate the success of the behavioral 
intervention in terms of employees’ welfare, the behaviorists point to the 
preferences revealed by subjects’ actual behavior—in this case, their failure 
 
93  See discussion infra Part III.C.2.a. 
94  Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 2, at 1176. 
95  See Camerer et al., supra note 3, at 1227‒30. 
96  Behaviorists also rely on present bias and hyperbolic discounting in support of nudges that would 
increase savings. See, e.g., David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 
443 (1997). 
97  Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 2, at 1172–73 (“[E]mployers think (correctly, we believe) that 
most employees would prefer to join the 401(k) plan if they took the time to think about it and did not 
lose the enrollment form . . . .”). 
98  Thaler & Benartzi, supra note 16, at S170. 
99  Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 2, at 1185; accord Thaler & Benartzi, supra note 16, at S186. 
100  Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 2, at 1191 (“The fact that very few participants choose to opt out 
supports (though it does not prove) the claim that they are helped by a system that makes joining 
easy . . . .”). 
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to opt out of the default—while simultaneously justifying the intervention 
on the ground that status quo and other biases render defaults “sticky” and 
revealed preferences therefore untrustworthy evidence of true 
preferences.101 The only meaningful difference is the preference of the 
would-be regulators for one outcome over the other.102 
2. Regulation of Consumer Credit.—Behavioral law and economics 
has provided the intellectual foundation for the new CFPB and a new 
approach to the regulation of consumer credit. The proponents argue the 
Bureau can promulgate rules and regulations that improve consumers’ 
decisionmaking by altering the design of consumer credit products, 
mandating various disclosures, restricting consumers’ choices, and 
instituting default rules in favor of standardized products approved by the 
Bureau.103 
The Bureau’s approach to regulating consumer credit is a direct 
outgrowth of the behavioral law and economics movement—indeed, the 
Bureau itself is the outgrowth of a 2008 article written by law professors 
Elizabeth Warren and Oren Bar-Gill.104 Another law professor, Michael 
Barr, who was an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Obama 
Administration, contributed to a second article laying out a series of 
proposals to regulate consumer credit, including the requirement that a 
lender offer every customer a basic or “plain vanilla” product before trying 
to sell him a product with additional features.105 The behavioral premise of 
these proposals is that “[m]any consumers are uninformed and irrational”106 
and therefore make “systematic mistakes in their choice of credit 
products”107 and require behaviorally informed policy interventions in order 
to reduce those mistakes and hence increase consumers’ welfare. Other 
 
101  For a discussion of this point, see Mitchell, supra note 27, at 1252 n.24, 1254–55 n.36. 
102  Recent evidence also supports skepticism concerning the claim that manipulating the choice 
architecture for retirement savings will “nudge” the decisions of those whose welfare will be increased 
while allowing nearly costless opt out by those whose welfare would not. See Anne Tergesen, 401(k) 
Law Suppresses Saving for Retirement, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2011, at A1 (discussing findings that while 
total 401(k) savings increased moderately due to greater participation at specified default rates, 
participants’ average savings rates fell after adoption of auto-enrollment because individuals who would 
have opted for higher savings rates in the absence of auto-enrollment accept the lower auto-enrollment 
default rate). 
103  See Evans & Wright, supra note 85, at 319–20; see also BARR ET AL., supra note 71, at 12‒15 
(discussing the potential structure of such rules and regulations). 
104  See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 71. 
105  See BARR ET AL., supra note 71, at 7‒9. This is consistent with the behaviorists’ preference for 
legal requirements to call attention to particular risks in order to offset consumers’ optimism bias, which 
causes them to underestimate the likelihood that they will personally suffer bad outcomes. See Christine 
Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 212–13 (2006). 
106  Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 71, at 21. 
107  Id. at 26. 
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behaviorist proposals concerning consumer credit include banning credit 
cards altogether108 and requiring credit card companies to unbundle 
transaction and financing services so that consumers could not use the same 
card to make a purchase and to finance it.109 The Bureau has broad powers, 
perhaps sufficient to implement these or similar behavioral interventions in 
the consumer credit market.110 
3. Sin Taxes.—Behaviorists also propose using taxes to improve 
individual decisionmaking and to offset the effects of behavioral biases. For 
example, Botond Kőszegi and Jonathan Gruber contend consumers would 
be made better off with higher taxes on goods as to which they exhibit time-
inconsistent preferences.111 While Kőszegi and Gruber have focused upon 
the theoretical and empirical case for higher taxes on tobacco products, 
other behaviorists have proposed sin taxes aimed at reducing errors 
committed by consumers who discount hyperbolically, especially with 
respect to the consumption of potentially unhealthful products, such as fatty 
foods, alcoholic beverages, and sugary sodas.112 
As discussed above, hyperbolic discounting invokes the concept that 
people value immediate gratification so much that they make decisions they 
will come to regret.113 The behaviorists often bundle this concept with the 
 
108  George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, “We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard Way”: 
Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 196‒98 (2006). 
109  Bar-Gill, supra note 42, at 1421–22. 
110  The CFPB has the broad authority to “ensure that the features of any consumer financial product 
or service, both initially and over the term of the product or service, are fully, accurately, and effectively 
disclosed to consumers in a manner that permits consumers to understand the costs, benefits, and risks 
associated with the product or service . . . .” 12 U.S.C. § 5532(a) (2006). This provision may authorize, 
for example, a plain vanilla requirement, at least if the CFPB interprets the statute to mean all or nearly 
all consumers must understand disclosures before it authorizes a product. See, e.g., Who’s Watching the 
Watchmen? Oversight of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
TARP, Fin. Servs. & Bailouts of Pub. & Private Programs of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t 
Reform, 112th Cong. 50 (2011) [hereinafter Who’s Watching the Watchmen?] (statement of David S. 
Evans, Chairman, Global Economics Group) (explaining that, even without explicit authority to do so, 
“the [CFPB] can also steer financial services companies toward offering plain vanilla products designed 
by the CFPB by either banning products that don’t conform to the CFPB view or by making it legally 
risky and expensive to deviate too far from the products that the CFPB wants”); Joshua D. Wright & 
Todd J. Zywicki, Three Problematic Truths About the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 
2009, LOMBARD ST., September 14, 2009, at 29, 41‒44 (discussing the vague mandates of the CFPA 
Act). 
111  See Jonathan Gruber & Botond Kőszegi, Is Addiction “Rational”? Theory and Evidence, 
116 Q.J. ECON. 1261, 1293–94 (2001); Gruber & Kőszegi, supra note 42, at 1980‒81; Jonathan H. 
Gruber & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Cigarette Taxes Make Smokers Happier, 5 ADVANCES ECON. 
ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 2 (2005). 
112  See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Studying Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a Model 
of Sin Taxes, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 186, 190‒91 (2003). 
113  See supra Part II.A.2. The original analysis of such time-inconsistent preferences in economics 
is R. H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV. ECON. STUD. 165 
(1955). 
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idea of “multiple selves” to argue that time-inconsistent preferences result 
in lower lifetime well-being for consumers because they regularly make 
decisions today that their future “self” will regret. Paralleling the economic 
concept of externalities,114 the behaviorists describe these costs as 
“internalities.” The case for sin taxes based upon the logic of internalities 
requires both an aggregate loss of total welfare when one sums up the 
utilities of all one’s selves across time, and some assumption about which 
of one’s multiple selves represents one’s true preferences. As we show 
below, however, there is neither a theoretical nor an empirical basis for the 
behaviorists’ implicit privileging of a future self who may or may not ever 
come into existence, depending upon the individuals’ age at death.115 
C. Behavioral Law and Economics and Economic Welfare 
Sunstein and Thaler are clear in stating the goals of the behavioral 
approach: to make individuals better off. But what is meant by “better off” 
in a world where individuals’ revealed preferences cannot be relied upon 
for inferences about their own welfare? Again, Sunstein and Thaler provide 
a clear answer: The appropriate measure of welfare is economic well-being 
as it would be expressed by the preferences of each individual if he were 
free of behavioral biases.116 Thus, the promise of behavioral law and 
economics lies in its potential to increase economic welfare according to 
each individual’s “true” preferences. As we have seen, the behavioral 
literature often appears to assume a reduction in errors is conclusive 
evidence of a move toward true preferences and hence of an increase in 
welfare. Much of this literature, in our view, overestimates the expected 
welfare benefits of behavioral interventions while underestimating some 
costs and altogether failing to take account of others. 
An economic analysis of the effects of a behavioral intervention 
requires not only an agreed-upon metric of welfare but also information 
sufficient to measure its effects. At its core, the promise of behavioral law 
and economics’ theory of errors is to design interventions that will make 
each individual better off by more closely aligning his choices with his 
“true preferences.” Once one assumes an individual’s decisions do not align 
 
114  See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 84 (1984) (“[P]eople act as if there 
were two selves alternately in command. . . . [T]he ways that people cope, or try to cope, with loss of 
command within or over themselves are much like the ways that one exercises command over a second 
individual.” (emphasis omitted)). 
115  See infra Part III.C.1. 
116  See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 176. 
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with his own preferences, however, evaluating the behaviorists’ welfare 
claims becomes difficult, if not impossible.117 
To date, critiques of behavioral law and economics and its promise of 
increasing welfare have raised three types of concerns: The behaviorists 
(1) as we discussed in the previous section, have no way to identify 
irrational decisions, (2) cannot reliably discern an individual’s “true 
preferences,” and (3) fail consistently to account adequately for the social 
costs of a proposed intervention. Each of these concerns raises significant 
doubt both about the presumption that error reduction alone increases 
welfare and about the potential for behavioral interventions to improve 
welfare. Having considered the first problem above, we now direct our 
attention to the other two concerns. 
1. The Search for True Preferences.—Behavioral law and 
economics’ claim to welfare-increasing intervention requires one to 
disregard the neoclassical assumption that actual behavior reveals evidence 
of welfare. How then do behavioral economists identify true preferences? 
In rejecting the standard understanding among economists that, by 
choosing x, an actor reveals he expects to be better off with x,118 the 
behaviorist conflates welfare and happiness. This critical difference 
concerning conceptions of economic welfare leads to a methodological 
divide: When the neoclassical economist finds an economic agent’s actual 
behavior departs from the prediction of his economic model, he suspects the 
model is to blame; when a behavioral economist observes a gap between 
actual and predicted behavior, he concludes the agent is acting against his 
own best interests. 
The neoclassical critique of the behaviorists’ view of the relationship 
between preferences and welfare is illuminated by examining the 
behaviorists’ model of the individual as multiple and distinct sequential 
selves with conflicting interests owing to different time perspectives. But 
the multiple-self model fails both in theory and in practice.119 The 
theoretical failure is simple: Economics does not provide a basis for 
identifying which of the multiple selves’ decisions expresses the 
individual’s “true” preferences for the purposes of welfare analysis. The 
convention in the behavioral literature, in order to make utility tradeoffs 
 
117  In Part IV of this Article, where we focus upon the underappreciated threat behavioral law and 
economics poses to individual liberty, we will assume for the sake of the argument that any given 
behavioral intervention offers a Pareto-superior alternative to the status quo. 
118  See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 121 (8th ed. 
2010) (describing the core economic concept of revealed preference, whereby “[i]f a bundle X is chosen 
over a bundle Y, then X must be preferred to Y”). 
119  We discussed supra Part II.B the empirical obstacles facing behaviorists relying on hyperbolic 
discounting models. 
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among the various selves possible, has been to adopt the long-run ex ante 
preference.120 Nothing, however, either in standard economic theory or in 
behavioral economics justifies this approach to identifying “true” 
preferences.121 
The manipulation of the standard welfare criterion in favor of long-run 
ex ante preferences, and thereby the behaviorists’ preferred alternative, is 
not a defensible basis upon which to claim departures from those 
preferences represent defects justifying a legal intervention. Untethered 
from the standard economic approach to welfare, the behaviorist’s approach 
becomes “both an opportunity and a rationale for activism,” and implicitly 
assigns to the economist the task of convincing individuals to improve their 
own decisionmaking and the welfare of their future selves or, alternatively, 
persuading a third party to intervene on behalf of the future selves.122 
As Rizzo and Whitman observe, a similar problem arises more 
generally with claims of welfare-reducing choices biased by context 
dependence, such as those affected by the status quo bias or the endowment 
effect.123 Once again, the behaviorist theory claims empirical proof of 
internal inconsistency of choices but cannot offer an empirical basis for 
identifying which choice represents one’s “true” preferences. With respect 
to framing, the question is not how to resolve conflicts between multiple 
selves but rather how to determine which context-dependent choice 
expresses the preference that maximizes welfare. After ruling out revealed 
preferences as expressions of true preferences, the behaviorist lacks a 
coherent principle to identify welfare-maximizing choices. Indeed, without 
revealed preferences, economic science simply cannot do so. The 
behaviorists can only declare by fiat what they expect a rational individual 
would or should dothereby justifying the imposition of correct choices by 
a third party, contrary to the behaviorist promise to maximize economic 
 
120  See, e.g., Gruber & Kőszegi, supra note 111, at 1287; O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 112, at 
190. 
121  See Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, Little Brother Is Watching You: New Paternalism 
on the Slippery Slopes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV 685, 701 (2009) (“[T]he normative standard inherent in any 
attempt to ‘help’ agents with hyperbolic preferences is inherently vague. We do not know where 
‘reasonable’ impatience ends and ‘excessive’ patience begins.”); see also Faruk Gul & Wolfgang 
Pesendorfer, The Case for Mindless Economics 38‒39 (Nov. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://economics.uchicago.edu/pdf/Pesendorfer040306.pdf (“Economists often note the arbitrariness 
of using U0 as a welfare criterion in the multiselves model. It is not clear what hedonic utility 
calculations have led neuroeconomists to decide that U0 represents the right trade-off among the hedonic 
utilities of the various selves.”). 
122  Gul & Pesendorfer, supra note 121, at 39. Gul and Pesendorfer describe this stance as 
“therapeutic” and “paternalistic,” and “similar to the position of medical professionals who attempt to 
cure a patient’s addiction.” Id.; accord Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational 
Addiction, 96 J. POL. ECON. 675, 681 (1988) (defining addiction as current behavior positively 
influencing future behavior). 
123  See Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 121, at 703. 
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welfare by the individuals’ own lights and undermining the behaviorist 
claim to the prefix “libertarian.” 
2. Errors of Omission in Behavioral Cost–Benefit  
Analysis.—Another concern regarding behavioral law and 
economics is that it proceeds from premises that ignore the often significant 
costs of intervention. We identify three types of omitted costs. 
a. The default rule.—Sunstein and Thaler claim choice 
architecture, or selection of a default rule,124 is “inevitable.”125 This may be 
so, but it neither requires nor implies that the stateor anyone elsemust 
always select the default rule.126 It is even less apparent that the state will 
select a default rule more closely aligned with an individual’s true 
preferences (as defined by the central planner) than what the individual 
himself would choose to do. As Mitchell points out, the inevitability claim 
regarding “manipulation of choices by central planners” holds only “so long 
as individuals remain subject to these irrational influences.”127 Mitchell 
demonstrates the claim of inevitability is not justified by the psychological 
literature, which identifies conditions under which individuals are not likely 
to be affected by framing.128 We can reject Sunstein & Thaler’s inevitability 
hypothesis on the ground that a less intrusive measure is often sufficient to 
eliminate the framing effect without exposing individuals to the risks of 
policy errors. 
Relatedly, behaviorist analyses of policy interventions often 
underestimate or ignore the cost of opting out of the default rule. The 
claimed “libertarian” aspect of behavioral interventions is that the 
manipulation of choice frames still respects freedom of choice; the 
individual can always reject the regulator’s preferred choice in favor of 
expressing his own preference, even if irrational. Many of the proposed 
behavioral interventions, however, simply do not live up to the claim of 
“choice-neutrality,” for they ultimately reduce or constrain available 
choices. For example, sin taxes raise the cost of opting out, while product 
bans go further, eliminating entirely the ability to opt out; the number of 
 
124  In contract law, a default rule is a right that acts as the standard unless waived by the party it 
benefits. See Sunstein, supra note 34, at 107. 
125  Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 2, at 1174. 
126  One alternative to the selection of a default rule may be to require that the individual make a 
choice, for example, about whether to participate in a payroll savings plan. 
127  Mitchell, supra note 27, at 1250‒51 (emphasis omitted); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, Cognitive 
Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 207, 224‒26 (2006) (discussing 
how “[t]he presence of significant individual variation in [cognitive] vulnerability” weakens the 
common cognitive psychology arguments supporting paternalistic interventions). 
128  See Mitchell, supra note 27, at 1251‒52. For a fuller explanation of the circumstances under 
which framing effects are likely to dissipate, see supra Part II.B.1. 
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choices practically available is reduced, respectively for some or for all 
individuals. 
Other proposed interventions, such as the plain vanilla requirement or 
the cooling-off period, impose significant costs upon those who would like 
to opt out. The behaviorally inspired Model Employment Termination Act, 
which Sunstein and Thaler support on the ground that it respects freedom of 
choice, would switch the legal default rule from employment “at will” to 
termination “for cause” only, but would require the employer to pay a 
substantial price to opt into the “at will” regime.129 Thus, the choice set of 
mutually agreeable employment contracts initially available to employers 
and employees is restricted, and opting out entails significant costs. These 
costs would be borne in part by employers and in part by employees, who 
are the intended beneficiaries of the scheme, because employers’ 
willingness to pay for labor will decline to reflect the additional risk they 
assume by hiring new employees subject to the penalties of the Act. 
Behaviorist policy analysis simply assumes these costs of opting out are at 
or near zero, thereby skewing regulators in favor of an intervention that 
reduces welfare. 
b. The cost of government intervention.—In addition to 
underestimating or ignoring the social cost associated with manipulating 
choice frames through legal default rules, behaviorists tend to underestimate 
the costs of implementing proposed policies—an error we term the 
“government intervention bias.” If one believes individuals are predictably 
irrational and will commit decisionmaking errors, then the relevant policy 
question is whether society is better off if error correction is supplied by 
individuals in markets or by individuals in the government.130 It is unclear 
that either bounded rationality or outright irrationality supports a larger role 
for government as opposed to greater private investment in error correction, 
but more government is inevitably the policy prescription favored by the 
behaviorist agenda.131 Answering this question requires comparative 
institutional analysis in order to identify the lower cost source of “error 
reduction.” The pro-government position suffers from two underlying 
problems. 
First, we question the behavioral economist’s implicit assumption that 
regulators are rational. As Judge Posner pertinently inquired: “Behavioral 
 
129  MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT §§ 3, 4(C), 7A U.L.A. 71, 312‒13 (2002); Sunstein & 
Thaler, supra note 2, at 1187. 
130  See Glaeser, supra note 48, at 134 (“[I]f psychological errors are understood to be endogenous, 
then there are good reasons why we might think that public decisionmaking is likely to be more flawed 
than private decisionmaking.”). 
131  Rachlinski, supra note 127, at 224 (“The most common use of cognitive psychology in legal 
scholarship is to support paternalistic legal interventions.”). 
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economists are right to point to the limitations of human cognition[, b]ut if 
they have the same cognitive limitations as consumers, should they be 
designing systems of consumer protection?”132 In response to Judge 
Posner’s question, Thaler posits that regulators’ bounded rationality has 
indeterminate conclusions for behavioral regulation. He explains: 
The premise of behavioral economics is that humans are not perfect decision-
making machines. . . . Even Judge Posner is human, and given the number of 
books he has written, he must have made a few mistakes in print. But our legal 
system needs judges, and one of the reasons we have a layered judicial system 
is so that mistakes by one judge can be corrected by others. Should we abolish 
our legal system because judges are known to make mistakes? 
 No government agency (or judge) will be error-free. The goal of the Nudge 
agenda sketched out in my co-authored book of that title was to create 
decision-making environments in which it is easier for error-prone human 
decision makers to choose well. The [CFPB] proposed by the administration is 
a good example of this kind of thinking. Even imperfect experts can help us 
achieve better outcomes, just as imperfect judges can help us enforce the law 
fairly. Until we invent the perfect human (or computer decision-making 
device), we have no good alternatives.133 
Thaler’s response proceeds from the Nirvana fallacy and hence misses 
the critical point: Neither governments nor individuals can make error-free 
choices. Perhaps, as Thaler says, “[e]ven imperfect experts can help us 
achieve better outcomes,” but the pertinent question is their comparative 
performance. How costly will government policy errors be if government 
actors suffer from, say, hyperbolic discounting or status quo bias, or are 
subject to framing effects? What will be the frequency and magnitude of 
those errors relative to relying upon private decisionmakers to correct their 
own errors to the extent they can do so? Can we trust behavioral regulators 
suffering from confirmation bias reliably to identify the true preferences of 
individuals, as they would have to do in order to implement successful 
behavioral polices?134 By casting the issue as whether people err—which no 
one could dispute—Thaler ignores the more subtle and fundamental points 
about the consequences of the choice to rely upon the government rather 
than private decisionmakers to correct errors.135 The counterintuitive 
 
132  Richard A. Posner, Op-Ed., Treating Financial Consumers as Consenting Adults, WALL ST. J., 
July 23, 2009, at A15. 
133  Thaler Responds to Posner on Consumer Protection, PBS NEWSHOUR (July 28, 2009), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/businessdesk/2009/07/thaler-responds-to-posner-on-c.html. 
134  For a discussion of the confirmation bias in the context of behavioral law and economics and its 
proponents, see Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of 
the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002). 
135  Nor do Sunstein, Thaler, or other behaviorists appear to be concerned with a research program or 
policy agenda intended to “nudge” regulators and judges to more rational evaluation of data or improved 
decisionmaking free from behavioral biases. For example, the behavioral literature does not appear to 
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presumption that irrationality among regulators is irrelevant consistently 
biases cost–benefit analysis in favor of government intervention. 
Second, the behaviorists’ government intervention bias depends upon 
their systematic underestimation of information costs. Behaviorist 
prescriptions for intervention assume regulators are able to recognize, 
gather, and process the data required to identify each individual’s “true 
preferences.”136 Their implicit assumption is that regulators enjoy a 
comparative advantage over private economic actors in acquiring 
information. Professors Mario Rizzo and Douglas Whitman describe this 
obstacle to welfare-increasing behavioral interventions as the “knowledge 
problem” of behavioral law and economics, derived from F.A. Hayek’s 
well-known critique of central planning.137 Rizzo and Whitman describe the 
dilemma facing behaviorists: 
If well-meaning policymakers possess all the relevant information about 
individuals’ true preferences, their cognitive biases, and the choice contexts in 
which they manifest themselves, then policymakers could potentially 
implement paternalist policies that improve the welfare of individuals by their 
own standards. But lacking such information, we cannot conclude that actual 
paternalism will make their decisions better; under a wide range of 
circumstances, it will even make them worse. New paternalists have not taken 
the knowledge problems that are evident from the underlying behavioral and 
economic research seriously enough.138 
The assumptions required to overcome the knowledge problem are 
both heroic and impossible. Behaviorists must assume regulators will be 
able simultaneously to (1) identify the distribution of individuals’ true 
preferences, (2) access reliable empirical data sufficient to identify 
departures from rational choice, (3) interpret those data accurately, and 
(4) design and implement policies so the reduction in errors works a net 
increase in welfare. The failure of any one of these assumptions is fatal to 
the behavioral enterprise; disregard of the knowledge problem biases the 
perceived costs of behavioral interventions. 
The knowledge problem necessarily invites regulators to misuse 
behavioral economics. The behavioral literature does not offer clear 
predictions of individual behavior when multiple cognitive biases infect 
 
include cooling off periods for regulatory decisions made in haste, or a plain vanilla requirement for 
novel applications of behavioral interventions that would require the government decisionmaker to be 
informed of the risks of policy error and the potential costs of unintended consequences. But see Josh 
Wright, A “Plain Vanilla” Proposal for Behavioral Law and Economics, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (July 
16, 2010, 8:53 AM), http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/07/16/a-plain-vanilla-proposal-for-behavioral-
law-and-economics/. 
136  Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 91, at 910. 
137  Id.; F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). 
138  Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 91, at 910. 
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decisionmaking. The interaction of biases is poorly understood even in 
controlled settings, much less in markets. Because behavioral economics 
generates indeterminate predictions in many settings, central planners have 
myriad opportunities to substitute their preferences (or the preferences of 
special interest groups) for those of the public. Furthermore, because 
behavioral economics produces a range of possibilities open to a regulator 
considering a proposed intervention, behavioral economics entails a much 
greater risk of policy error than would reliance upon the relatively narrow 
predictions of price theory.139 Any rigorous evaluation of the costs and 
benefits of behavioral intervention must account for the potential abuse or 
simply mistaken use of behavioral economics by regulators. 
Consider, for example, the recent policy decision to implement the 
Making Work Pay income tax credit as a slow and recurring decrease in 
withholding rather than a one-time lump-sum reduction. Behavioral 
economists, including Sunstein and Thaler,140 predicted that one-time tax 
cuts, such as the 2008 tax rebate, would be less effective in stimulating 
economic activity than would recurring payments because individuals 
would be more likely to treat the latter as disposable income.141 The limited 
available evidence, however, suggests their prediction was incorrect.142 
Claudia Sahm, Matthew Shapiro, and Joel Slemrod found, contrary to the 
behaviorist prediction, 25% of households reported that the one-time 
economic stimulus payment in 2008 would lead them to mostly increase 
their spending while only 13% reported that the extra pay from the lower 
withholding in 2009 would lead them to mostly increase their spending.143 
Either of these classes of objectionsthe default rule fallacy or the 
government intervention biasis sufficient to undermine dramatically or to 
reject altogether the welfare-based case for behavioral law and economics. 
Even if, however, we assume the behavioral economics research and policy 
programs can avoid all such problems and would be justified on pure 
 
139  See Ginsburg & Moore, supra note 88, at 96–97 (“[Behavioral economics] is almost the opposite 
of price theory, which narrows significantly the range of outcomes a court may reach;” instead it 
“increases the degrees of freedom with which a court may pursue personal, idiosyncratic goals.”). 
140  See James Surowiecki, A Smarter Stimulus, NEW YORKER, Jan. 26, 2009, at 25 (attribution to 
Thaler); Claudia R. Sahm et al., Check in the Mail or More in the Paycheck: Does the Effectiveness of 
Fiscal Stimulus Depend On How It Is Delivered?, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
16246, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16246.pdf (citing Cass Sunstein & Richard 
Thaler, How Behavioral Economics Could Show Up in the New Stimulus Package, NUDGE BLOG (Jan. 
20, 2009), http://nudges.org/2009/01/20/how-behavioral-economics-could-show-up-in-the-new-stimulus 
–package/ (no longer available online)). 
141  See Barry Schwartz, On the Economic Stimulus Package: The “Packaging” Counts, PSYCHOL. 
TODAY (Feb. 1, 2009), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-choices-worth-having/200902/the-
economic-stimulus-package-the-packaging-counts. 
142  See Sahm et al., supra note 140, at 1‒3. 
143  Id. at 29. Sahm, Shapiro, and Slemrod use survey data based upon telephone interviews to assess 
the impact of the tax rebates. Id. at 6 & n.9. 
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economic welfare grounds, the behaviorist calculation of the net increase in 
societal welfare ignores the significant but underappreciated threat to 
individual liberty posed by government interventions predicated upon 
behavioral law and economics. 
IV. BEYOND WELFARE: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY 
In the brave new world contemplated by the advocates of government 
policies informed by behavioral law and economics, many more aspects of 
each individual’s life would be regulated, or more stringently regulated, 
than at present. This would be true even if the behaviorists’ agenda were 
limited to matters of health and finance, the two major subdivisions of 
Thaler and Sunstein’s book,144 each of which they define capaciously; the 
former, for example, includes smoking, nutrition, and medical insurance,145 
while the latter includes credit cards, investing, and saving for retirement.146 
Assuming, again, the behavioral law and economics regulatory agenda 
could be implemented in a manner that avoids the problems discussed in 
Part III, and in a manner that increases or at least does not reduce economic 
welfare, that agenda would still present a substantial threat to the liberty of 
the individual. The current literature, however, assigns no weight to liberty 
beyond the narrow focus upon choice preservation; it is nearly devoid of 
thinking about the implications of behavioral law and economics for 
individual autonomy and about the social significance of autonomy’s 
further diminution.147 How should one evaluate a regulatory intervention 
that would increase welfare but also diminish liberty? What are the 
mechanics of trading off welfare and liberty when the two are in tension? 
To be sure, a minor reduction in liberty should not be sufficient to reject an 
intervention with significant welfare benefits just as an intervention 
generating only modest welfare benefits is not justified regardless of its 
negative effect upon liberty. 
In close cases it will be necessary to consider such trade-offs in order 
fully to assess the desirability of a proposed policy intervention.148 
Assigning a precise value to liberty in the regulatory calculus is an 
impossible task given that individuals value their liberties to different 
degrees and policy makers have no way of knowing those valuations or 
their distribution. Even without assigning a precise weight to a loss of 
 
144  See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 17. 
145  Id. at 157–96. 
146  Id. at 101–56. 
147  Mitchell, supra note 27, at 1260‒64. 
148  Regulatory proposals that reduce welfare for the reasons described in Part III will necessarily 
reduce liberty. The theoretically plausible set of “close calls” involves interventions that would increase 
welfare while posing a significant threat to liberty. 
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liberty, however, it is inevitable that such losses, if taken into account, will 
sometimes––perhaps often––defeat the case for intervention.149 We believe 
the best approach to evaluating these potential tradeoffs is to establish a 
presumption against behaviorist regulation that reduces liberty, rebuttable 
only by demonstrating that the regulation is likely to generate significant 
gains in economic welfare. It is to those liberty concerns that we now turn. 
A. Autonomy 
John Stuart Mill followed Immanuel Kant150 in noting explicitly the 
value of autonomy in its own right, that is, apart from what one does with 
one’s autonomy or the consequences of its exercise.151 Mill’s point was that 
a fully realized human being is one who makes the important decisions in 
his own life: 
If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, 
his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best 
in itself, but because it is his own mode. Human beings are not like sheep; and 
even sheep are not undistinguishably alike. . . . If it were only that people have 
diversities of taste that is reason enough for not attempting to shape them all 
after one model. But different persons also require different conditions for 
their spiritual development . . . .152 
On the related topic of unthinking conformity to a tradition or custom, 
which he acknowledges may embody the teachings of experience, Mill’s 
observation is a cautionary note with equal application for those who would 
relieve the citizen of the need to decide things for himself: 
[T]o conform to custom, merely as custom, does not educate or develop in him 
any of the qualities which are the distinctive endowment of a human being. 
The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental 
activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a choice.153 
 
149  For example, these liberty concerns are likely to dominate behaviorist regulatory proposals with 
positive, but trivial, expected welfare benefits. 
150  See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 97‒98 (Lara Denis 
ed., Thomas K. Abbott trans., Broadview Press 2005) (1785). 
151  Cf., e.g., JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 306 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 
1988) (1690) (“[T]he end of Law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge Freedom . . . . 
Freedom is . . . a Liberty to dispose, and order, as he lists, his Person, Actions, Possessions, and his 
whole Property, within the Allowance of those Laws under which he is; and therein not to be subject to 
the arbitrary Will of another, but freely follow his own.”). 
152  JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 5, 75 (John Gray ed., 
1991) (1859); accord JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL 
IMPORTANCE 67 (1986) (“One component of agency is deciding for oneself. Even if I constantly made a 
mess of my life, even if you could do better if you took charge, I would not let you do it. Autonomy has 
a value of its own.”). 
153  MILL, supra note 152, at 65. 
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And finally, in words that fortuitously seem to anticipate Thaler and 
Sunstein’s ideas on manipulating the default rule for enrolling employees in 
payroll savings plans,154 Mill exhorts: 
He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use 
observation to see, reasoning and judgement to foresee, activity to gather 
materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, 
firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. 155 
More than a century later, Friedrich Hayek, in The Constitution of 
Liberty, made a slightly different point about the value of having more 
rather than fewer choices: 
[T]he importance of our being free to do a particular thing has nothing to do 
with the question of whether we or the majority are ever likely to make use of 
that particular possibility. . . . [T]he less likely the opportunity, the more 
serious will it be to miss it when it arises, for the experience it offers will be 
nearly unique.156 
As Amartya Sen would later point out, this consideration relates to “the 
process aspect of freedom,” which “includes considerations that may not 
figure in the accounting of the opportunity aspect [of freedom].”157 In 
particular, Sen identifies 
(i) decisional autonomy of the choices to be made, and (ii) immunity from 
interference by others. The former is concerned with the operative role that a 
person has in the process of choice, and the crucial issue here is self-decision, 
e.g., whether the choices are being made by the person herself—not (on her 
behalf) by other individuals or institutions.158 
Behaviorists in general do not place any value upon the “the process 
aspect of freedom” or “decisional autonomy.”159 Sunstein and Thaler in 
particular claim to preserve the choices now open to people by, for 
example, merely altering default rules without preventing the determined 
 
154  See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 103–17. 
155  MILL, supra note 152, at 65. 
156  F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY: THE DEFINITIVE EDITION 83 (Ronald Hamowy 
ed., 1960). 
157  Amartya Sen, Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism 
in Promoting Individual Freedoms, 45 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 519, 523‒24 (1993). 
158  Id. at 524; cf. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL 
STATEMENT 27 (1980) (noting that “[s]elf-interest is not myopic selfishness. It is whatever it is that 
interests the participants, whatever they value, whatever goals they pursue,” including their altruistic 
goals). 
159  Sunstein and Thaler would assign zero weight to decisional autonomy unless it is linked with a 
welfare-based preference for decisionmaking. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 2, at 1198–99 (“Freedom 
of choice is itself an ingredient in welfare. In some situations people derive welfare from the very act of 
choosing. . . . But much of the time, especially in technical areas, people do not particularly enjoy the 
process of choice . . . .”). In practice, they ignore it altogether. 
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individual from opting out; as we have seen, however, that is not always the 
case, and it is never without cost to the person whose preference is different 
from theirs. Indeed, the proposals they advance are libertarian only in the 
limited sense that they “do not block choice” altogether.160 As Mozaffar 
Qizilbash observes, Sunstein and Thaler do not address the deeper 
antipaternalist objection that their proposals deny the inherent value 
individuals place upon autonomy.161 Autonomy—“deciding for oneself”—
has value that “run[s] contrary to even the weak form of paternalism” 
favored by Sunstein and Thaler, rendering “the idea of ‘libertarian 
paternalism’ as they define it . . . potentially incoherent.”162 
Sometimes Sunstein and Thaler obscure their coercive instinct from 
view, as in the example with which they begin Nudge. There they instance 
the “director of food services for a large city school system” who has 
“formal training in nutrition.”163 She can have food presented in the schools’ 
cafeterias in any sequence, including the sequence that is best for the 
children and the one that will maximize profits.164 Sunstein and Thaler mean 
to point out the inevitability of some choice being made and of that choice 
influencing the children’s preferences. Their choice of setting, however, 
defeats this implication. In their hypothetical illustration, the nutritionist 
ultimately influences children, who have less autonomy than do 
adultswhich is why most of them are in school. The “choice architect” 
works for a public school system, not a for-profit enterprise, the mission of 
which school system is to educate children, perhaps even on the subject of 
nutrition. What the nutritionist’s choice, inevitable or not, has to do with the 
case for the government manipulating adults, who are sovereign in the 
marketplace, remains obscure.165 
Limiting the range of decisions to be made by individuals or burdening 
those who would make an officially disfavored choice—not saving enough, 
eating unhealthful foods, etc.—tends to infantilize the public. Effective 
decisionmaking is acquired through trial and error, that is, by making a 
 
160  Mozaffar Qizilbash, Well-Being, Preference Formation and the Danger of Paternalism 23 (Max 
Planck Inst. of Econ. Papers on Econ. & Evolution, Working Paper No. 0918, 2009), available at 
ftp://papers.econ.mpg.de/evo/discussionpapers/2009-18.pdf. 
161  Id. 
162  Id. 
163  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 1. 
164  Id. at 1–3. 
165  Sunstein clarified the connection in an earlier work, instancing “the cafeteria at some 
organization” and rather lamely suggesting that if the cafeteria’s goal is profit maximization, then even 
“those cafeterias that face competition will find that some of the time, market success will come not 
from tracking people’s preferences, but from providing goods and services that turn out, in practice, to 
promote their welfare, all things considered. Consumers might be surprised by what they end up 
liking . . . .” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR 178‒79 (2005). Clearly Sunstein and Thaler have little 
to offer when they move from a coercive to a market environment, where consumers are sovereign. 
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decision and either getting verbal feedback about or directly observing the 
success or failure of one’s decision as a means of reaching one’s goal.166 
Moreover, “when people are motivated to be accurate, they expend more 
cognitive effort on issue-related reasoning, attend to relevant information 
more carefully, and process it more deeply, often using more complex 
rules.”167 
The lesson, which is, ironically, ignored in the prescriptive behavioral 
law and economics literature, is clear: The more palpable the consequences 
of one’s decisions, the more indelible the imprint of experience.168 Indeed, 
there is reason to think experimental results such as these tend to understate 
significantly the value of experience gained outside the confines of the 
experiment, i.e., in the marketplace. As Glaeser has pointed out, the 
subjects enrolled in an experiment face limited incentives, which are 
much stronger in the real world than in the laboratory. In experiments, 
individuals have few tools with which to improve their reasoning, and their 
only real method of responding to incentives is to think harder. Outside of the 
lab, people have access to advisers, books, the Internet, and more time. Their 
 
166  James P. Byrnes et al., Learning to Make Good Decisions: A Self-Regulation Perspective, 
70 CHILD DEV. 1121, 1122 (1999); see also JAMES P. BYRNES, THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
DECISION MAKING: A SELF-REGULATION MODEL 27–28 (1998) (relying upon the approach used in the 
field of artificial intelligence in formulating the self-regulation model for rational task analysis and 
observing “[n]o one would disagree with . . . my claim that decision making requires the[se] four 
processes”). The experimental literature shows that subsequent decisions are more likely to be improved 
by experiencing success or failure than by being told one’s decision was a success or a failure and why. 
Byrnes et al., supra at 1137. Experimental studies suggest “adults could progressively learn to make 
better decisions if they received relatively clear feedback from outcomes.” Id. at 1125, 1137 (citing two 
studies in support of the general proposition adults will make better decisions as a result of clear 
feedback and two studies that conclude older children are more likely to exhibit improved 
decisionmaking as a result of feedback than are young children). Klick and Mitchell have expanded 
somewhat upon Byrnes’s findings, concluding that, because feedback is obtained “[t]hrough education, 
experimentation, experience, and observation,” increased activity or opportunity in these areas will 
likewise lead individuals to “select the option that will lead to the most favorable outcomes.” Klick & 
Mitchell, supra note 83, at 1629. A related body of studies in experimental psychology shows that 
individuals better remember and more closely analyze unfavorable feedback than they do favorable 
feedback. See, e.g., Peter H. Ditto et al., Motivated Sensitivity to Preference-Inconsistent Information, 
75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 65 (1998). 
167  Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 481 (1990). 
168  Consistent with this inference, Vernon Smith and James Walker’s review of the experimental 
literature on the effect of incentives on decisionmaking finds that “[s]ome studies report observations 
that fail to support the predictions of rational models, but as reward level is increased the data shift 
toward these predictions.” Vernon L. Smith & James M. Walker, Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost 
in Experimental Economics, 31 ECON. INQUIRY 245, 259‒60 (1993). Consequences need not be serious, 
however, for the effect of a choice to provide valuable feedback; studies show the repetition of feedback 
that accompanies making similar decisions may be useful to the decisionmaking process. See List, 
Market Experience, supra note 14, at 70 (“I find strong evidence that individual behavior converges to 
the neoclassical prediction as trading experience intensifies.”); Smith, supra note 52, at 118 (noting that 
rational behavior tends to emerge “in the context of a repetitive market institution”). 
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willingness to spend time and money to use these resources will surely depend 
on the stakes involved in the decision.169 
It is precisely because individuals invest more effort when making 
more important decisions that paternalistic policies relieving them of 
responsibility for those decisions will have the most corrosive effect upon 
their decisionmaking ability.170 Klick and Mitchell describe this cost of 
libertarian paternalism as a type of moral hazard, which in the long run 
would raise error rates because people would invest less in error 
correction.171 Nor is it reasonable to think the adverse effect will be felt with 
respect only to a narrow class of similar decisions; a muscle that has 
atrophied is rendered incapable of any strenuous activity, regardless of the 
particular purpose of that activity. 
If individuals are to realize their full potential as participants in the 
political and economic life of society, then they must be free to err in large 
ways as well as small. The fatal flaw of libertarian paternalism is to ignore 
the value of the freedom to err. Interestingly, Hayek said as much in making 
the inherently antipaternalistic case for The Constitution of Liberty: “Man 
learns by the disappointment of expectations.”172 “Liberty not only means 
that the individual has both the opportunity and the burden of choice; it also 
means that he must bear the consequences of his actions and will receive 
praise or blame for them. Liberty and responsibility are inseparable.”173 In a 
passage that, if heeded, would have saved the behaviorists a great deal of 
effort, he wrote: 
The justification for assigning responsibility is thus the presumed effect of this 
practice on future action; it aims at teaching people what they ought to 
consider in comparable future situations. . . . This does not mean that a man 
will always be assumed to be the best judge of his interests; it means merely 
that we can never be sure who knows them better than he . . . .174 
James Buchanan also emphasizes the relationship between liberty and 
responsibility,175 and in particular, individuals’ demand for institutions that 
insulate them from responsibility: “Relatively few persons are sufficiently 
strong, as individuals, to take on the full range of liberties and their 
accompanying responsibilities without seeking some substitute or 
 
169  Glaeser, supra note 48, at 140. 
170  See Klick & Mitchell, supra note 83, at 1635–36. 
171  Id. at 1626. 
172  HAYEK, supra note 156, at 82. 
173  Id. at 133. 
174  Id. at 139. 
175  James M. Buchanan, Afraid to Be Free: Dependency as Desideratum, 124 PUB. CHOICE 19, 23 
(2005) (observing that the academy has “failed to emphasize sufficiently, and to examine the 
implications of, the fact that liberty carries with it responsibility”). 
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replacement of the parental shelter.”176 The role of economists is to remedy 
the “widespread failure to understand that the independence offered by the 
entry and exit options of the market offsets the dependence on others when 
markets are closed or displaced.”177 Hayek and Buchanan illustrate that the 
political and economic value of the freedom to err derives from the exercise 
of individuals’ liberty but requires sufficient independence from the state 
that individuals bear the costs of their choices. 
Thinking about the implications of paternalism—soft or hard, 
libertarian or totalitarian—both for individuals and for the society they 
compose, yields some testable hypotheses. For one, we would expect 
people who were raised in a paternalistic state, and hence relieved of the 
need to make many important decisions for themselves, to have less well-
developed decisionmaking skills and to be more risk averse. As it happens, 
there is a body of literature in cognitive psychology that tends to support 
this hypothesis; it proceeds from an understanding of the characteristics 
associated with entrepreneurship. 
In general, “entrepreneurs . . . exhibit a particular mode of information 
processing, or cognitive style.”178 They are more alert to opportunities that 
require linking previously unrelated information.179 Indeed, the 
experimental literature strongly tends to validate Israel Kirzner’s 
description of the Austrian tradition, which “postulates a tendency for profit 
opportunities to be discovered and grasped by routine-resisting 
entrepreneurial market participants.”180 
In a socialist state, however, resistance is futile. Uncritical acceptance 
of the party line is essential to survival, much less advancement. Of course, 
there are choices to be made: Shall I read Pravda or Izvestia? Yet the choice 
set has been limited by the state in a way that serves the state’s ends, not 
those of the individual.181 As Milan Simecka so graphically recounted from 
his personal experience after the Prague Spring of 1968, the Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia controlled the citizenry by depriving individuals of 
their decisional autonomy in only three respects: The state determined their 
 
176  Id. at 24. 
177  Id. at 27. 
178  Amir N. Licht, The Entrepreneurial Spirit and What the Law Can Do About It, 28 COMP. LAB. 
L. & POL’Y J. 817, 819 (2007). 
179  Id. at 824–25; see also Connie Marie Gaglio & Jerome A. Katz, The Psychological Basis of 
Opportunity Identification: Entrepreneurial Alertness, 16 SMALL BUS. ECON. 95, 96–98 (2001). 
180  Israel M. Kirzner, Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian 
Approach, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 60, 71 (1997). 
181  See KATHERINE VERDERY, WHAT WAS SOCIALISM, AND WHAT COMES NEXT? 26 (1996) 
(explaining that the purpose of socialism was “to accumulate means of production” in order “to redirect 
resources to a goal greater than satisfying the population’s needs”). 
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housing, their occupation, and their children’s education.182 That is why this 
professor of mathematics in mid-career became an operator of construction 
equipment. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that his book was published in 
1984.183 
The end of the Soviet era in Russia and the Eastern European states it 
dominated, and the very substantial movement in China toward a market 
economy, provide useful comparisons. The Soviet experience uniquely 
spanned the lives of three generations over a period of seventy-four years.184 
The experience of Eastern Europe with communism lasted about forty-five 
years and in most places did not entail as comprehensive a form of state 
control over the economy;185 unlike in Russia, therefore, at the end of the 
communist era there were many small business owners as well as people 
with pre-communist business experience who could rekindle the 
entrepreneurial spirit. China began to shift to a more privatized economy 
even in the late 1970s, after only thirty years of economic totalitarianism, 
again during the lifetime of pre-communist-era business people.186 
Transnational comparisons using data from the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor187 produce strong evidence that, even after 
controlling for relevant variables, all countries with a communist past have 
a lower rate of entrepreneurship activity than do other countries.188 A recent 
study concludes that even now those unfortunate countries have “low levels 
of entrepreneurial human capital that have been engendered by decades of 
 
182  See MILAN SIMECKA, RESTORATION OF ORDER: THE NORMALIZATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
1969‒1976 (A.G. Brain trans., 1984). 
183  See id. at 18; see also KEVIN DEVLIN, HOW NORMAL IS NORMALIZATION? 4 (1982), available at 
http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/pdf/139-4-7.pdf. 
184  See Ruta Aidis et al., Institutions and Entrepreneurship Development in Russia: A Comparative 
Perspective, 23 J. BUS. VENTURING 656, 658 (2008). 
185  See, e.g., TONY JUDT, POSTWAR: A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945, at 428 (2005) (noting that 
Hungary under János Kádár implemented economic reforms in 1968 to promote a “mixed economy” 
with some local autonomy and private ownership); David Lipton & Jeffrey Sachs, Creating a Market 
Economy in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY, no. 1, 1990, at 
75, 80–82 (noting that farmers in Poland “retained their private land after World War II,” and a larger 
though still restricted “private sector ha[d] been allowed to operate under the reforms in Hungary and 
Poland” during communism). 
186  Louis Putterman, The Role of Ownership and Property Rights in China’s Economic Transition, 
in CHINA’S TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY 85, 86 (Andrew G. Walder ed., 1996) (“The period from 1978 to 
the early 1990s was marked by a massive shift . . . with significant new participation by foreign and 
domestic private firms.”); see also Jonas Alsén, An Introduction to Chinese Property Law, 20 MD. J. 
INT’L L. & TRADE 1, 20–21 (1996) (detailing shift to more private ownership in China beginning in 
1978); Richard D. Cudahy, From Socialism to Capitalism: A Winding Road, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 39, 
53‒56 (2010) (noting “[t]he flexibility of the Chinese in economic matters seemed to far exceed the 
Soviets” and discussing China’s cautious shift toward privatization). 
187  GLOBAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP MONITOR, http://www.gemconsortium.org (last visited Aug. 13, 
2012). 
188  See Aidis et al., supra note 184, at 658‒59, 662. 
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existence under a central planning system that tended to blunt individual 
incentives.”189 As one would expect, however, the level of entrepreneurship 
is “significantly lower in Russia.”190 A study conducted jointly by Russian 
and U.S. scholars concludes that “[t]he absence of freedom of decision-
making in the most important resource—the workforce—and the ‘no-
choice’ employment situation were two fundamental obstacles to the 
development of entrepreneurship” during the communist era.191 After the 
fall of communism, moreover, Russian entrepreneurs tended to be younger 
than was typical elsewhere;192 only the young were unscathed by their 
nation’s paternalistic history. 
B. A Slippery Slope 
Of course, no proponent of regulation based upon the findings of 
behavioral economics espouses a regime remotely as encompassing and 
restrictive as even the least oppressive of the late, unlamented communist 
regimes. There is reason to believe, however, they would put us on a 
slippery slope—or push us that much further down the slope than we have 
already slid.193 
Paternalistic policies are, by nature, likely to be slippery.194 Such 
policies are expressed in regulations specifically adopted, at least initially, 
for the benefit of those regulated and, if those individuals do not want to be 
regulated for their own good—which is hardly unusual—the regulators will 
likely deem ever more stringent measures necessary. The federal laws 
protecting the occupants of automobiles provide a familiar historical 
example.195 Initially, the regulators merely required manufacturers to install 
seatbelts in all automobiles. As the Supreme Court has recounted: “It 
became apparent, however, that most occupants simply would not buckle 
 
189  Martin Robson, Explaining Cross-National Variations in Entrepreneurship: The Role of Social 
Protection and Political Culture, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 863, 890 (2007). 
190  Aidis et al., supra note 184, at 657, 670 (attributing difference in part to weak institutions to 
support entrepreneurial development). 
191  Alexander I. Ageev et al., Entrepreneurship in the Soviet Union and Post-Socialist Russia, 
7 SMALL BUS. ECON. 365, 369 (1995). 
192  See id. at 371, 374 (finding entrepreneurs in Russia are younger than their counterparts in Poland 
and Hungary). 
193  See Douglas Glen Whitman & Mario J. Rizzo, Paternalistic Slopes, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 
411, 412 (2007) (“A slippery slope argument is one suggesting that a proposed policy or course of action 
that might appear desirable now, when taken in isolation, is in fact undesirable (or less desirable) 
because it increases the likelihood of undesirable policies being adopted in the future.”). 
194  See Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 121, at 691–705 (stating “slippery slopes flourish in the 
presence of a gradient or continuum,” and “[t]he new paternalist paradigm . . . relies on discarding sharp 
distinctions in favor of gradients”). 
195  For a brief history of federal seat belt laws, see Barry L. Huntington, Welcome to the Mount 
Rushmore State! Keep Your Arms and Legs Inside the Vehicle at All Times and Buckle Up . . . Not for 
Safety, But to Protect Your Constitutional Rights, 47 S.D. L. REV. 99, 101–04 (2002). 
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up their belts,” so the regulators turned to requiring various passive 
restraints, including airbags, automatic seat belts, and briefly even an 
“ignition interlock” device that prevented a car from starting if an occupant 
had not fastened his seatbelt.196 “But the interlock and buzzer devices were 
most unpopular with the public.”197 Then the regulators threatened the states 
with sanctions if they did not adopt laws requiring that seat belts be used.198 
Each of these mandates imposed a cost upon the manufacturers and the 
purchasers of automobiles, but not upon the government officials who 
formulated them. On the contrary, each successive measure tended to 
insulate the regulators from legislative and bureaucratic reprisals. Risk 
regulators—whether they supervise financial institutions, protect the 
environment, or certify foods and drugs as fit for useface asymmetrical 
incentives that inevitably put them on a slippery slope: They stand to be 
criticized if their initial measures are insufficient to prevent all harms of the 
sort they are tasked (or have tasked themselves) with preventing; they will 
not be fully rewarded until they have fully accomplished their mission. 
Also, regulatory missions tend to expand;199 “mission creep”200 assures 
that the government agency will require more money and more staff over 
time, forestalling any danger of the agency accomplishing its mission and 
becoming redundant.201 Just as the development of a vaccine for polio 
threatened to put the March of Dimes charity out of business202 (and caused 
it to adopt a mission that could never be fully achieved, namely, 
 
196  See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 875–77 (2000) (discussing history of federal 
regulations requiring passive restraints). 
197  Id. at 876. 
198  Huntington, supra note 195, at 101‒02. States without mandatory seatbelt laws also receive 
reduced federal funding for highway maintenance. Id. at 102. 
199  See MILTON FRIEDMAN, WHY GOVERNMENT IS THE PROBLEM 9 (1993) (“The general rule is 
that government undertakes an activity that seems desirable at the time. Once the activity begins, 
whether it proves desirable or not, people in both the government and the private sector acquire a vested 
interest in it. If the initial reason for undertaking the activity disappears, they have a strong incentive to 
find another justification for its continued existence.”); see also Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 121, at 
717–23 (arguing that the adoption of a moderate paternalist policy makes the adoption of further policies 
more likely because the proponent can argue the now-accepted justification for the first policy also 
provides a foundation for the new policy). 
200  Gary W. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753, 805 
n.212 (2011) (“Mission creep refers to an organizational phenomenon in which entities inadvertently, 
over time, stray from their fundamental mission by engaging in activities or behaviors less closely 
related to the core . . . purpose.”). 
201  See, e.g., Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1, 3 (2002); Fred S. 
McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 101, 117 (1987). 
202  See HOWARD P. GREENWALD, ORGANIZATIONS: MANAGEMENT WITHOUT CONTROL 369 
(2008); DAVID L. SILLS, THE VOLUNTEERS: MEANS AND ENDS IN A NATIONAL ORGANIZATION 253–54 
(1957). 
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“improv[ing] the health of babies” worldwide203), government agencies are 
always on the lookout for conduct that needs to be regulated. Mission creep 
is a concern regardless whether an agency’s purpose is paternalistic, but 
with a mandate to regulate conduct for the benefit of the regulated 
individuals, there is no end to the good an agency may attempt to do at the 
expense of those individuals’ freedoms.204 
Once a regulation is in place it may well come to be accepted as the 
new norm. Extension of the regulation then seems like a modest and indeed 
logical next step.205 Smoking bans are a case in point.206 The federal 
government first determined that cigarette smoking is bad for the smoker’s 
health and so advised the public. When the public’s behavior did not 
conform to the regulators’ expectations for what rational people would do, 
i.e., give up smoking, they ratcheted up the regulatory intervention: 
warnings were required on cigarette packages, tobacco advertisements were 
prohibited from television, and sin taxes were imposed upon the purchase 
of cigarettes.207 The regulators’ preferences notwithstanding, millions of 
people continued to smoke cigarettes.208 The federal government then 
publicized the hazard smoking posed to nonsmokers, which provided a 
new, externality-based rationale for banning smoking.209 This rationale was 
flawed, of course, because there was no gap in the relevant property rights: 
Patrons of restaurants and bars who did not want to be exposed to 
secondhand smoke could take their custom elsewhere. The expressed 
concern for employees of those establishments was similarly flawed in that, 
unlike the unfortunate subjects of the Soviet system, they were free to 
change their place of employment. Eventually, the ban on smoking in bars 
 
203  Global Programs, MARCH OF DIMES, http://www.marchofdimes.com/mission/ 
globalprograms.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2012). 
204  See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Experience 
should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are 
beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded 
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but 
without understanding.”). 
205  See Whitman & Rizzo, supra note 193, at 441; cf. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 666–72 (1998) (describing work by scholars concluding law can regulate social 
norms); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 964 (1996) (“Many 
laws have an expressive function. They ‘make a statement’ about how much, and how, a good or bad 
should be valued. They are an effort to constitute and to affect social meanings, social norms, and social 
roles. Most simply, they are designed to change existing norms and to influence behavior in that 
fashion.”). 
206  See Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 121, at 720–23. 
207  Id. at 720. 
208  See Trends in Current Cigarette Smoking Among High School Students and Adults, United 
States, 1965‒2010, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/ 
data_statistics/tables/trends/cig_smoking/index.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2012). 
209  See Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 121, at 720. 
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and restaurants was generalized by many local governments to all indoor 
spaces and recently has spawned proposals to ban smoking out-of-doors in 
some localities,210 notwithstanding the lack of any reason to be concerned 
with the welfare of third parties there. 
As the assault on smoking proceeded down the slope, the justification 
for each new step zigged and zagged between the paternalistic and 
fallacious externality-based rationales. In fact, once smoking was deemed 
unhealthful to smokers and bystanders alike, the actual rationale for each 
next step became unimportant.211 The previous step had established the new 
normal, and the next step was but a small effort to perfect implementation 
of the norm. 
It is upon similarly flawed grounds that the historical concept of 
“public health” evolved from a concern with contagious disease212 into a 
paternalistic, all-encompassing concern with the health of the public.213 If 
smoking is unhealthful, that is now enough to deem it a matter of public 
health. So, too, with obesity214 and other self-determined and noncontagious 
harms—if harms they are in the eyes of the individual who smokes or 
overeats. 
 
210  See, e.g., Sewell Chan, ‘No Smoking’ Could Be Rule Outdoors, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2009, 
at A1 (discussing the New York City Health Commissioner’s proposal to ban smoking at city parks and 
beaches). 
211  See Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 121, at 722 (“[F]urther restriction of public smoking became 
acceptable with little or no evidence of significant harm to bystanders.”). 
212  BERNARD J. TURNOCK, ESSENTIALS OF PUBLIC HEALTH 4 (2d ed. 2012) (noting the “clear 
intent” of creating state public health agencies in the late nineteenth century was that their “powers be 
used to battle epidemics of infectious diseases”). 
213  For example, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health—formerly the Office of Public 
Health and Science, 75 Fed. Reg. 53,304 (Aug. 31, 2010)—currently comprises eleven public health 
offices with missions ranging from “improv[ing] the quality of healthcare across the United States” to 
“[c]oordinat[ing] adolescent health promotion and disease prevention . . . .” Public Health Offices, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ash/public_health/indexph.html (last visited 
Aug. 13, 2012). The World Health Organization, the objective of which is “the attainment by all peoples 
of the highest possible level of health,” defines “health” as “a state of complete physical, mental and 
social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.” Constitution of the World Health 
Organization, WORLD HEALTH ORG. pmbl., art. 1 (Oct. 2006), http://www.who.int/governance/eb/ 
who_constitution_en.pdf. Similarly, the mission of the U.S. National Institutes of Health is “to enhance 
health, lengthen life, and reduce the burdens of illness and disability.” Mission, NAT’L INSTS. OF 
HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about/mission.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2012). 
214  The legal effort to promote more healthful eating started in 1990 with the enactment of the 
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, which authorized the Food and Drug Administration to issue 
rules requiring that food bear nutrition labels. See Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990); see also 
21 C.F.R. pt. 101 (implementing regulations). This effort has evolved into outright bans on the use of 
trans fats in restaurants. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 81.08 (West 2006). The Centers for Disease Control 
refers to obesity as an “epidemic.” CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, OBESITY: 
HALTING THE EPIDEMIC BY MAKING HEALTH EASIER 2 (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
chronicdisease/resources/publications/AAG/pdf/obesity.pdf (“American society has become 
‘obesogenic,’ characterized by environments that promote increased food intake, nonhealthful foods, 
and physical inactivity. Public health approaches that affect large numbers of different populations in 
multiple settings—communities, schools, work sites, and health care facilities—are needed.”). 
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The theoretical and empirical problems that make the case for 
behaviorally inspired regulation so weak also increase the probability that, 
once adopted, such a regulation will have an even more pronounced 
tendency to expand. If the regulation is justified on the ground that there is 
a divergence between the expressed preference and the “true preference” of 
the regulated persons, and assuming that, based upon experimental data 
worthy of reliance, the degree of that divergence can be estimated for each 
individual, the regulator will initially have to make his best guess as to the 
degree of debiasing pressure to exert. Suppose, for example, my true 
preference is to save more tomorrow for retirement—specifically, $100 
more per month—or to eat a less fattening diet—specifically, enough less to 
lose one pound per month for 25 months. How much must the regulator 
burden my poor choices to spend rather than save and to indulge rather than 
abstain in order to goad me into making choices aligned with my true 
preferences? The answer, alas, is blowing in the wind and hence out of 
reach. 
If the burden the regulator imposes initially does not produce the 
expected result, then it will seem self-evidently insufficient; the obvious, 
self-serving, and hence nearly inevitable response will be to ratchet up the 
pressure as many times and as much as needed, not to re-examine whether 
there is really a gap between the expressed and the true preference, whether 
it is of the magnitude estimated, and whether there are other explanations 
for the initial or successive burdens’ failure to work as expected. Perhaps 
my true preference for saving, as detected in the laboratory, changed when a 
member of my family developed a health problem that made a more 
immediate demand upon my income. Perhaps I shifted my consumption of 
fattening foods, when they were taxed highly enough, to consumption of 
unhealthful quantities of foods that would not be fattening in the 
recommended serving size. As long as the regulator can tax only the inputs, 
and not the output in the form of a tax based upon my weight, it can only 
continue to cumulate the burdens in the hope of getting lucky. As the king 
might have said upon learning all his men and all his horses could not put 
Humpty Dumpty together again, this “simply proves to me that I must have 
more horses and more men.”215 
On the other hand, suppose the burden initially established by the 
regulator over-corrects the bias at which it is aimed. I start saving too much 
for retirement—that is, more than my true preference—because I would 
rather forgo present gratification than have my money go to the government 
in taxes; and I consume insufficient calories because I do not substitute 
healthful foods for the sweets I consumed before the sin tax took the 
 
215  Dana Fradon, NEW YORKER, July 24, 1978, at 29. 
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pleasure out of eating. For all that appears to the regulator, the taxes it 
imposed upon unsaved income and fattening foods will have been a 
success. It will have no incentive to learn whether the regulation overshot 
the mark and induced an unexpected adaptation; doing so could only cause 
it to confess its error and ratchet down the tax. To admit to overregulating is 
more embarrassing than to confess to having underregulated, for the public 
is somewhat grudging about being regulated at all.216 
V. WHY THIS, WHY NOW? 
Behavioral law and economics is produced primarily by law 
professors. As we have seen, the number of articles on behavioral law and 
economics appearing in law reviews has grown exponentially over the last 
ten years.217 What, we now ask, accounts for the great and increasing 
attraction of the subject to legal academics? 
For at least the last forty years, legal scholarship has been swept along 
by waves of fashion in academia, and the amplitude of those waves has 
been increasing. Starting around 1970, the Realist school that had 
dominated the legal academy for decades gave way increasingly to the 
newer field of economic analysis of law; particularly after Richard Posner 
published his treatise on that subject in 1973,218 scores of articles analyzing 
the economics of a particular legal doctrine appeared in law journals every 
year.219 They contributed greatly to our understanding of the law as an 
instrument of social control and as a force for the promotion or diminution 
of economic growth. Articles and books in this genre continue to be 
published,220 but they no longer have as large a share of the market. 
 
216  In addition, as pointed out by Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 121, at 717, “rent-seeking activities 
impart a particular direction to slippery slopes . . . . As a result, we are unlikely to observe ‘backward’ 
slippage toward more laissez-faire policies.” (emphasis omitted). 
217  See supra Fig. 1; see also Ginsburg & Moore, supra note 88, at 94 (cataloging the number of 
law review articles discussing behavioral economics). 
218  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973). 
219  See, e.g., William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes Toward Risk: 
An Economic Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1973); Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical 
Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, 
Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of 
Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977); Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 351 (1978); Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 411 (1977); George L. Priest, Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under 
the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach, 91 HARV. L. REV. 960 (1978); Alan Schwartz 
& Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979). 
220  See, e.g., ANN-SOPHIE VANDENBERGHE, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 
(2004); Judy A. Temple et al., Cost-Effective Crime Prevention: Economic Analysis of the Chicago 
Child-Parent Centers Early Education Program, 15 PUB. INT. L. REP. 181 (2010). 
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In something of a reaction to the growing interest in economic 
analysis, a small but prolific cadre of law professors created the Critical 
Legal Studies (CLS) movement,221 which in turn inspired cognate sub-
schools such as Critical Race Theory,222 Critical Feminism,223 and Queer 
Theory.224 CLS, which had a significant following, particularly among 
faculty at elite law schools, advanced the idea that all law, including court-
made law, is indistinguishable from politics, particularly class politics.225 As 
recounted by Harvard Law School Professor Duncan Kennedy, a leading 
figure in the CLS movement, one of its early projects was to “produce[] a 
critique of mainstream economic analysis of law.”226 
 
221  See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 1 (1987) (“[T]he first annual 
Conference on Critical Legal Studies in 1977 gave little hint as to what the organizers thought ‘critical 
legal studies’ (CLS) was or might become. . . . [T]he organizers were simply seeking to locate those 
people working either at law schools or in closely related academic settings [who were] . . . something 
akin to New Leftists . . . .”). 
222  See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE xvi (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 
2d ed. 2000) (noting that Critical Race Theory “has predecessors—Critical Legal Studies, to which it 
owes a great debt”). 
223  See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 617‒19 
(1990) (charting the relationship between CLS and feminist theories, identifying “crosscutting 
objectives, methodologies, and concerns” between the two fields and observing a “growing body of 
feminist and critical race scholarship . . . developed along lines that paralleled, intersected, and 
challenged critical legal theory”). 
224  See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of 
“Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 
29 (1995) (“[T]his project endeavors to enlist critical legal theories and theorists in an effort to create a 
space and a framework for holistic and contextual critiques of sex, gender, and sexual orientation as 
legal (and social) concepts.”); see also Minna J. Kotkin, Creating True Believers: Putting Macro Theory 
into Practice, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 95, 101–02 (1998) (“Critical jurisprudence also finds expression in 
feminist legal theory, critical race theory, and queer theory. These movements are alternatively viewed 
as off-shoots of CLS or independent schools of legal thought that changed the focus of CLS. In either 
case, by the late 1980s, critical scholarship had shifted to some degree from exclusively economic 
analysis to the exploration of how issues of race, gender, and sexuality determine legal outcomes.”). 
225  See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780–1860 (1977); 
KELMAN, supra note 221; ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); Mark 
Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 669, 676‒77 (1979); Mark G. Kelman, Misunderstanding Social Life: A Critique of the Core 
Premises of “Law and Economics,” 33 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 274, 277‒78 (1983); Duncan Kennedy, How 
the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE REV. L. & SOC. ACTION 71 (1970); Duncan Kennedy, Legal 
Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591, 591‒92 (1982) [hereinafter 
Kennedy, Legal Education]; Duncan Kennedy, Psycho-Social CLS: A Comment on the Cardozo 
Symposium, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 1013 (1985) [hereinafter Kennedy, Psycho-Social CLS]; Duncan 
Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 178 
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002); Duncan Kennedy, Toward a Critical Phenomenology of 
Judging, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 141 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 
1987). For a more complete bibliography of the CLS movement, see Duncan Kennedy & Karl E. Klare, 
A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461 (1984). 
226  Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in 2 THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465, 465 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
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Overtly a leftist movement,227 CLS turned out to be little more than a 
warmed-over species of Marxism, as it had evolved in the hothouse of 
radical European social theorists such as Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen 
Habermas, and others of the Frankfurt School of neo-Marxist critical 
theorists, Antonio Gramsci, a leader of the Communist Party in Italy, and 
Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and other “poststructuralist” 
philosophers.228 The self-declared purpose of the CLS movement was “to 
provide a critique of liberal legal and political philosophy” that would show 
the “liberal embrace of the rule of law is actually incompatible with other 
essential principles of liberal political thinking.”229 
Key to the CLS analysis was the notion of “false consciousness,”230 
meaning the “holding of false or inaccurate beliefs that are contrary to one’s 
own social interest and which thereby contribute to the maintenance of the 
disadvantaged position of the self or the group.”231 Like the presumed gap 
between revealed preferences and “true preferences,” assuming a wedge 
between reality and the perceptions of others provides a space to be filled 
by some combination of reeducation and outright coercion.232 Duncan 
Kennedy encapsulates these Maoist233 tendencies in his proposal that 
 
227  KELMAN, supra note 221, at 1; Kennedy, Psycho-Social CLS, supra note 225, at 1014, 1017. 
228  See David S. Caudill, Disclosing Tilt: A Partial Defense of Critical Legal Studies and a 
Comparative Introduction to the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, 72 IOWA L. REV. 287, 299‒304 (1987); 
Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 102 n.102 (1984). 
229  ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE 3 (1990); accord KELMAN, 
supra note 221, at 1–8. 
230  This phrase is often attributed directly to Marx. But see Joseph McCarney, Ideology and False 
Consciousness, MARX MYTHS AND LEGENDS (Apr. 2005), http://marxmyths.org/joseph-
mccarney/article.htm (questioning whether Marx ever actually described ideology as “false 
consciousness”). The phrase, if not the concept, seems actually to derive from an early translation of a 
letter Friedrich Engels wrote to Franz Mehring. See MICHÈLE BARRETT, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH: FROM 
MARX TO FOUCAULT 5–6 (1991). 
231  John T. Jost, Negative Illusions: Conceptual Clarification and Psychological Evidence 
Concerning False Consciousness, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 397, 400 (1995) (emphasis omitted); accord 
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Essences, and the Dilemma of Social 
Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 639, 653 n.57 (1993) (defining “false consciousness” as the “phenomenon in 
which the oppressed come to identify with their oppressors, internalize their views, and thus appear to 
consent to their own subordination”). 
232  As one student of Kennedy’s put it, the phrase “implies that all those who disagree with you are 
stupid.” RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, BROKEN CONTRACT: A MEMOIR OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 166 
(1999). 
233  See A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 768 (2003) (noting that under Habermas’s theory of self-deception, 
“[e]xplanation, education, discussion, and even therapy may serve to allow everyone except those 
suffering from the worst forms of self-delusion to understand (or, at least, better understand) their true 
interests”); Robin J. Munro, Political Psychiatry in Post-Mao China and Its Origins in the Cultural 
Revolution, 30 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 97, 103 (2002) (“[I]f we use class education and 
political-line education to profoundly re-educate the mentally ill in the proletarian worldview . . . and 
raise their awareness of the class struggle, the struggle over political line and the need to continue the 
revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . and dig out the roots of mental illness by 
overthrowing the concept of private ownership and implanting the principle of public ownership . . . 
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professors and janitors at the Harvard Law School be required to trade 
places for one month each year.234 Kennedy described the ultimate goal of 
CLS as “building a left bourgeois intelligentsia that might one day join 
together with a mass movement for the radical transformation of American 
society.”235 
The end of the communist era in Russia and Eastern Europe dealt a 
blow to CLS, as it did to all leftist movements. The worldwide triumph of 
socialism, which had long seemed inevitable to so many, now seemed more 
improbable than ever. That is not to say that CLS surrendered or even went 
underground; the leading authors are still publishing,236 but new recruits are 
scarce.237 
With interest in CLS and other “critical” movements waning, young 
legal scholars were in danger by the mid-1990s of being remitted to further 
work in economic analysis of law or even more traditional doctrinal 
exegesis. The widespread excitement and productive fervor of law and 
economics scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s, however, could not be 
recovered. Whereas the pioneering work had been done by academic 
lawyers who were autodidacts in economics, such as Richard Posner, 
Robert Bork, Henry Manne, Gordon Tullock, and Guido Calabresi,238 and 
 
then the overwhelming majority (90%) of mentally ill people can be completely cured.” (quoting Jia 
Rubao, a psychiatrist from Shaanxi Province, April 1977)). 
234  See Kennedy, Legal Education, supra note 225, at 615 (proposing legal education be reformed 
by “equaliz[ing] all salaries in the school (including secretaries and janitors), regardless of educational 
qualifications, ‘difficulty’ of job, or ‘social contribution’” and encouraging every university employee or 
faculty member to “spend one month per year performing a job in a different part of the hierarchy from 
his normal job, [so that] over a period of years everyone [is] trained to do some jobs at each hierarchical 
level”); see also Randy Beck, The Faith of the “Crits”: Critical Legal Studies and Human Nature, 
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 433, 447 (1988) (“Among [Kennedy’s] more familiar proposals is his 
suggestion that law schools allocate positions in the starting class by lottery to all students possessing 
minimum qualifications and that janitors and law professors periodically switch jobs.”). 
235  Kennedy, Legal Education, supra note 225, at 610. 
236  See Duncan Kennedy, Teaching from the Left in My Anecdotage, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 449 (2007); Steven Lukes, In Defense of “False Consciousness,” 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19. 
237  See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: On Academic Fads and Fashions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 
1255 (2001) (discussing the disappearance of critical legal studies from law schools). In 2007, Brian 
Leiter compiled a list of the most cited faculty members by specialty, including Critical Theories, which 
includes Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory, and Feminist Legal Theory. The ages of the top 
twenty members ranged from mid 40s to 60s, showing a lack of young entrants in the field. Brian Leiter, 
Most Cited Law Professors by Specialty, 2000‒2007, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCHOOL RANKINGS, (Dec. 
18, 2007), http://www.leiterrankings.com/faculty/2007faculty_impact_areas.shtml#CriticalTheory. 
More recently, the 2010‒2011 edition of the Association of American Law Schools Directory of Law 
Teachers listed only ninety-nine professors with one to five years of experience currently teaching 
Critical Theories, which also includes Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory, and Feminist Legal 
Theory. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS: 2010‒2011 DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1627–
28, 1669–70 (2011). 
238  See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978); 
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); POSNER, 
supra note 218; Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE 
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by collaborations between those same academics and their economist 
colleagues,239 by the mid-1990s all the leading law schools had appointed to 
their faculties one or more Ph.D. economists, many of whom also had a law 
degree. In other words, the field had grown up; the creative and talented 
amateurs gave way to highly trained professionals using the formal tools of 
economics and statistics. An assistant professor without significant formal 
training in economics could not hope to distinguish himself in law and 
economics, let alone write something to warrant his promotion to a tenured 
position.240 What to do? 
The answer came: Behavioral law and economics, for which a more 
than sophomoric understanding of economics was not required. Just as the 
first wave of law and economics scholarship had provided hundreds of 
opportunities to revisit plowed ground and turn up new insights, behavioral 
law and economics offered a reason to return to the same ground with 
confidence that the new approach would yield new results—results that 
could be published in one of the more than 750 non-peer-reviewed, student-
edited law reviews.241 Much of the early law and economics work had 
explored the hypothesis that a particular common law rule was efficient242 
or, in the public choice variation, that a particular statutory provision served 
some special interest and was inefficient.243 In the new behavioral 
 
L.J. 499 (1961); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Henry G. Manne, Mergers 
and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare 
Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967). 
239  See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & Alvin K. Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 585 (1985); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976). Pioneering examples include JAMES M. BUCHANAN & 
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY (1962); Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. 
REV. 363 (1965); and Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 
51 NW. U. L. REV. 281 (1956). 
240  See generally Henry G. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, The Future of Law and Economics: A 
Discussion 10‒11 (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 08-35, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1145421 (discussing the shift toward the modern, 
formal, mathematical approach to economics and its implication for law and economics and legal 
education). 
241  The Berkeley Electronic Press law review submission service, ExpressO, includes more than 
750 student-edited law reviews and journals. See List, EXPRESSO, http://law.bepress.com/expresso/ 
list.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2012). 
242  See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 238, at 311‒18; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 517 (1980); A. Mitchell 
Polinksy, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 
32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1079‒80 (1980); cf. John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing 
and the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72, 77‒96 (1980) (arguing conventional investment practices of 
trusts are inadequate with the portfolio theory and therefore yield inadequate returns). 
243  See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political 
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 394‒96 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the 
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15–16 (1984) (“People demand laws just as they demand 
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scholarship, the author would inevitably conclude the prevailing rule should 
be reformed to take account of the cognitive biases of the individuals 
subject to the rule244 or to regulate some as yet unregulated conduct in order 
to protect individuals from their tendency to err as they pursue their self-
interest.245 
Because behavioral law and economics scholarship yields proposals 
for law reform less radical than what CLS had produced, it appeals to a 
larger segment of the legal professoriate than CLS ever did. At the same 
time, behavioral law and economics shares with CLS the paternalistic 
premise that the poor wretches to be benefitted by the insights of their 
governors suffer from a form of “false consciousness.” Behavioral law and 
economics scholars never use that term—the connotation would not be 
helpful—but they have built their entire enterprise upon its foundation. 
Indeed, we doubt legal academics would have seen the appeal of 
appropriating the fruits of cognitive research had they not first been 
exposed by CLS to the idea that individuals routinely fail to act in their own 
best interest as they themselves express it. 
False consciousness is a hearty perennial, much like the notion that that 
there is a “third way” of social organization that suffers from neither the 
arbitrary nature of government nor the unforgiving ways of the market. The 
staying power of the idea reflects the romantic notion that government can 
 
automobiles, and some people demand more effectively than others. Laws that benefit the people in 
common are hard to enact because no one can obtain very much of the benefit of lobbying for or 
preserving such laws. Smaller, more cohesive groups are more effective lobbyists. These groups can 
obtain a greater share of the benefits of laws targeted to assist people who have common characteristics, 
and so they will raise more money and campaign for legislation more effectively. . . . It also turns out 
that small, cohesive groups can get more for themselves by restricting competition and appropriating 
rents than by seeking rules that enhance the welfare of all. Thus we should expect regulatory programs 
and other statutes to benefit the regulated group—they need not ‘capture’ the programs, because they 
owned them all along. The burgeoning evidence showing that regulatory programs increase prices for 
consumers and profits for producers supports this understanding.”); McChesney, supra note 201, at 
101‒03; Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 240 
(1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3‒4 
(1971). 
244  See, e.g., Michael S. Barr et al., Behaviorally Informed Home Mortgage Credit Regulation, in 
BORROWING TO LIVE: CONSUMER AND MORTGAGE CREDIT REVISITED 170, 197–98 (Nicolas P. 
Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2008) (arguing for a default option of plain vanilla mortgages). 
245  Nutrition labeling on menus exemplifies well the creeping nature of paternalism. Initially 
required by only a few cities and states—most notably, New York City, Philadelphia, and the state of 
California—the House of Representatives proposed to bring nutrition labels to restaurant menus 
nationwide in its first three drafts of the Affordable Health Care for America Act. See Shirley S. Wang, 
Menu Labeling to Go National, Thanks to Health Bill’s Passage, WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG (Mar. 22, 
2010, 2:16 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2010/03/22/menu-labeling-to-go-national-thanks-to-health-
bills-passage/; see also Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 2572 (2009) 
(as introduced to the Senate on November 16, 2009). The labeling provision did not survive the Senate, 
Preservation of Access to Care for Medicare Beneficiaries and Pension Relief Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-192, 124 Stat. 1280, but it is unlikely we have seen the last of the nutrition-labeling proposal. 
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help individuals overcome their own frailties and conform their behavior to 
their stated goals. 
The full effect the behaviorists’ new formulation of this old idea will 
have upon policy is yet to be determined. Academic lawyers and 
economists who studied regulation and the economic analysis of law had a 
profound impact upon the government of the United States starting in the 
Carter Administration. In those four years, the Congress passed significant 
deregulatory legislation affecting energy,246 transportation,247 and other 
sectors of the economy.248 The Congress was less obliging during the 
Reagan Administration, but the President’s appointees did much 
administratively to deregulate telecommunications,249 finance,250 energy,251 
and other sectors.252 Reagan also appointed to the federal courts a number of 
law professors prominent in the economic analysis of law, including such 
luminaries as Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook of the University of 
Chicago, Robert Bork and Ralph Winter of Yale, and Stephen F. Williams 
of the University of Colorado. 
 
246  See, e.g., Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15, 16, and 42 U.S.C.) (phasing out price regulations); 
Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-2, 91 Stat. 4 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 717). 
247  See, e.g., Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 5 and 49 U.S.C.); Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 
(codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 
Stat. 1705 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); Air Cargo Deregulation Act of 1977, Pub. L. 
No. 95-163, 91 Stat. 1278 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 49 U.S.C.). 
248  See, e.g., Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 22, 38, and 42 U.S.C.) (preempting various 
state restrictions on mortgages). 
249  See, e.g., Revision of Programming & Commercialization, Policies, Ascertainment 
Requirements, & Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 6 FCC Rcd. 5093 
(1991) (eliminating ascertainment requirements and programming guidelines for commercial television); 
Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, 5052 (1987) (invalidating “fairness doctrine” as 
unconstitutional and contrary to public interest), aff’d, Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 
(D.C. Cir. 1989); Amendment of Part 73 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations in Regard to Section 
73.642(a)(3) & Other Aspects of the Subscription Television Serv., 90 F.C.C.2d 341 (1982) (abolishing 
various programming and other restrictions for subscription television); In re Deregulation of Radio, 84 
F.C.C.2d 968 (1981). 
250  See, e.g., Shelf Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-6499, 48 Fed. Reg. 52,889 (Nov. 23, 
1983) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. § 230.415) (reducing registration requirements for mortgage-
related securities); Davis W. Turner, Note, Nonbank Banks: Congressional Options, 39 VAND. L. REV. 
1735, 1736, 1744 (1986) (describing willingness of the Comptroller of the Currency in the Reagan 
Administration to charter “nonbank banks,” thereby allowing companies to escape restrictions of various 
banking laws and regulations). 
251  See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,287, 46 Fed. Reg. 9909 (Jan. 30, 1981) (eliminating oil price 
controls immediately rather than phasing out over time). 
252  See Improvement of TOFC/COFC Regulation, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,348, 14,352 (1981) (exempting 
“piggyback” services from certain railway and trucking rules); Mary A. Wallace, Interstate Commerce 
Commission, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 937, 938‒41 (1988) (describing the Commission’s largely 
successful efforts at deregulating the transportation industry in the 1980s). 
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The Obama Administration has now made behavioral law and 
economics the foundation for its re-regulatory program.253 The President has 
appointed the leading proponent and popularizer of the behavioral 
approach, Cass Sunstein, to oversee the regulatory output of the Executive 
Branch.254 Whether this Administration will be able to work a substantial 
change in the government’s approach to regulation will depend vitally upon 
whether the President is re-elected. Enduring changes of this magnitude 
cannot be made in a mere four years, in large part because a change in 
political leadership does not effect a change in the composition of the 
bureaucracy;255 the Administration’s challenge is to educate the permanent 
staff in how to initiate regulatory proposals based upon the new 
behaviorism. 
CONCLUSION 
Even the least paternalistic version of behavioral law and economics 
makes two central claims about government regulation of seemingly 
irrational behavior: that (1) the behavioral regulatory approach, by 
manipulating the way in which choices are framed for consumers, will 
increase welfare as measured by individuals’ own preferences and (2) a 
central planner can and will implement the behavioral law and economics 
policy program in a manner that respects liberty and does not limit the 
choices available to individuals. Some economists and law professors have 
focused, in their disparate ways, upon these two claims, offering critiques 
grounded in microeconomic theory, empiricism, and public choice. The 
crux of their critiques, with which we agree, is that the behaviorists’ welfare 
claims are in some cases misspecified and, in the others, unsupported by 
robust data; such data as exist are misinterpreted in support of a paternalist 
objective; and the behaviorists’ cost–benefit analysis is woefully 
incomplete. While behavioral economics broadly, and behavioral law and 
economics in particular, are too new to support bold predictions about what 
future laboratory and field evidence might show, the theoretical and 
empirical infirmities plaguing the behavioral welfare claims suggest these 
 
253  See Ferguson, supra note 84, at 18; Grunwald, supra note 84, at 29; Mike Dorning, A Beachhead 
for the Behavorialists [sic], BUS. WK., June 28, 2010, at 19 (“[T]he behavioralists could be influencing 
regulations long after [Peter] Orszag leaves [OMB]. Their ideas have been seeded in numerous 
initiatives, just as the regulatory state is poised for a dramatic comeback following decades of 
retrenchment. Other promoters include Michael S. Barr, the Assistant Treasury Secretary for Financial 
Institutions, who helped draft Obama’s Wall Street reforms.”). The first chairman of President Obama’s 
Council of Economic Advisers was Austan Goolsbee, who is sympathetic to (but not himself a 
practitioner of) behavioral economics. See Lori Montgomery, New Economic Face, Still Familiar, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2010, at A12. 
254  Ferguson, supra note 84, at 18. 
255  Indeed, the CFPB is perhaps the only major behavioral law and economics initiative that will be 
realized within the President’s first term. 
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faults will prove to be enduring limitations. Further, the chasm between the 
aggressive policy interventions proposed in the behavioral law and 
economics literature and the interventions (if any) warranted by existing 
behavioral economic theory and empirical evidence is a warning sign of a 
discipline far overextended. 
Our primary goal in this Article has been to draw attention to the 
second and less scrutinized of the behaviorists’ claims, viz., that behavioral 
law and economics poses no significant threat to liberty and individual 
autonomy. One need not await further evidence to conclude that this claim 
fails. The behaviorists’ regulatory toolkit includes not only overt coercion, 
but also subtler forms of control, including interventions that would directly 
or indirectly either reduce the choices available to individuals or penalize 
individuals for pursuing their own preferences rather than following those 
of a regulator. Despite having adopted a narrow conception of liberty as 
consisting only of “choice preservation,” the behaviorists’ libertarian claims 
fail on their own terms. What Mill, Hayek, Friedman, and others taught 
about the “process aspect of freedom”—the liberty interest of a public that 
is not infantilized, has entrepreneurial spirit, and can learn effective 
decisionmaking through experience—has no place in the behaviorists’ 
regulatory calculus. So long as behavioral law and economics continues to 
ignore the value to economic welfare and individual liberty of leaving 
individuals the freedom to choose and hence to err in making important 
decisions, libertarian paternalism will not only fail to fulfill its promise of 
increasing welfare while doing no harm to liberty; it will pose a significant 
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